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ABSTRACT
Rule I Ob-5, a powerful weapon against any publicly-listed company
whose share price drops on adverse news, is particularly skewed against
pharmaceutical and other bio-technology companies (bio-pharmas). It is
not a coincidence that there is a disproportionate number of class actions
filed against bio-pharmas. The volume and complexity of data underlying
most bio-pharma cases create enormous outcome uncertainties, settlement
pressures, and potentially huge contingent liabilities over substantial
periods of time. The vulnerability and risks that bio-pharmas face in Rule
JOb-5 class actions are unique among all publicly-traded industries, yet
many cases proceed along traditional grounds without courts employing
either their statutory or inherent powers to obtain objective expert
assessment of the data underlying plaintiffs' claims. Most judges have
neither the training nor the capacity to differentiate between the positions of
opposing experts or to reach their own independent assessment of the
research data.
The unstated premise of the Supreme Court's Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals opinion is that courts have an obligation to fully
understand the evidence prior to any decision-making, and that the use of
court-appointed experts will allow judges to decide motions to dismiss with
greater confidence and accuracy. The early appointment ofsuch experts
may also have the salutary effect of causingplaintiffs to pause and consider
whether the claims are sufficient to warrant the up-front imposition ofcourt-
appointed expert costs. Ifcourts begin to recognize in greater numbers the
importance ofobtaining objective expert testimony, we believe that a more
level playing field will evolve to reduce the disproportionate vulnerability of
bio-pharmas to securities law class actions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
More than 2000 patients with renal cell carcinoma, or kidney cancer,
participated in a clinical trial of the GlaxoSmithKline drug pazopanib.' The
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) reported that the three deaths
'See Press Release, GlaxoSmithKline PLC, GlaxoSmithKline Receives Unanimous FDA
Panel Approval Recommendation for Votrient (Oct. 5, 2009), available at http://www.gsk.com/m
edia/pressreleases/ 2009/ 2009_pressrelease 10103.htm.
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observed were "from liver injury that [was] related to or associated with
pazopanib."2 However, members of the FDA Oncologic Drugs Advisory
Committee, including experts in liver injury, said it wasn't clear if the three
deaths were from drug induced liver injury.' Despite their doubts, the panel
unanimously recommended that the FDA approve pazopanib for the
treatment of patients with kidney cancer.! On October 19, 2009, the FDA
acted upon the panel's recommendation and approved pazopanib to be
marketed and sold under the name Votrient.'
Pazopanib is just one example where scientists, experts, and the
FDA are unsure whether a pharmaceutical or biotechnology product has an
acceptable benefit-to-risk profile for human treatment. Experts may disagree
or be uncertain as to conclusions to be drawn from the data. Uncertainty in
the scientific world is mirrored in the investment world, as investors in
publicly-traded pharmaceuticals and biotech companies (herein collectively
referred to as "bio-pharmas")are similarly situated in trying to determine
whether a pharmaceutical or biotech product has an acceptable investment
benefit-to-risk profile. Investors are eager to embrace companies developing
the next blockbuster drug or device, but litigation history suggests that
investors are not as willing to accept the downside losses when promising
developments fail. Bio-pharmas are susceptible to broad swings in stock
prices given the enormous cost-benefit scales involved in product
development and revenue potentials. When high prices based on future
prospects turn into disappointing losses, class action lawsuits are often not
far behind.
The paradigmatic securities fraud case against bio-pharmas, as noted
by one court of appeals, begins "where a promising drug or medical device is
approved by the FDA and then later proves to have health risks which affect
the market for the drug."' The benefit-to-risk profile in both the scientific
and investment realm are closely linked, but despite the high risks and
2Jennifer Corbett Dooren, Kidney-Cancer Drug Gets Panel's Backing, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6,
2009, at D3.
4Id.
5Press Release, GlaxoSmithKline PLC, FDA Approves GlaxoSmithKline's Votrient for
Advanced Renal Cell Cancer (Oct. 19, 2009).
6N.J. Carpenters Pension & Annuity Funds v. Biogen IDEC Inc., 537 F.3d 35,47 (1st Cir.
2008). Recent class action litigation includes: Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275 (3d Cit. 2000)
(holding that defendant corporation's statements regarding the inconclusiveness of the relationship
between its weight-loss drugs Pondimin and Redux and heart-valve disorders did not constitute an
actionable material misrepresentation or omission), and In re Elan Corp. Sec. Litig., 543 F. Supp. 2d
187 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that investors did not sufficiently allege facts supporting an inference
of scienter against the makers of MS drug, Tysabri).
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uncertainties, investors are wont to cry foul when health concerns pop up
during or after the FDA approval process. Responding to one such class
action, a district court compared investing in an untested pharmaceutical
product to investing in "an airplane company before Orville and Wilber
Wright figured out how to make them fly: there was a huge upside potential
but also a pretty good chance of losing everything."' The court dismissed the
plaintiffs securities fraud class action mindful of the fact that "securities
laws do not exist to provide down-side investment insurance."'
Investment risks in bio-pharmas are different than all others because
of the combination of (i) the enormous costs of product development, (ii) the
magnitude of potential rewards, (iii) the complex, imprecise, and scientific
nature in the products offered, and (iv) the active and often unpredictable
role of the FDA in determining product marketability. These factors lead to
uncertainty in forecasted results for a product before and, if FDA approved,
after marketing has begun. As researchers are processing data, company
executives are making disclosures to an interested investing public,
disclosures often compelled by SEC reporting requirements or by the
insatiable appetites of investment analysts. As noted in one survey of
securities litigation:
Because life sciences companies are in the business of
venturing into the unknown, their stock price is inherently
volatile. Moreover, it is an unmistakable fact that only a
small number of new drugs survive the FDA approval
process, often leading sciences companies to face bad news
concerning adverse events, patient harm, or unexpected
results.... Thus, the volatility of a life sciences company's
stock, the various challenges that these companies face in the
life cycle of a drug, and the required disclosure of information
are all factors that make life sciences companies particularly
vulnerable to securities fraud class actions.'
71n re Northfield Labs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 769, 784 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
Coincidentally, one of the authors of this article also used the Wright Brothers history to analyze the
securities laws. See Stuart R. Cohn, The Impact of Securities Laws on Developing Companies:
Would the Wright Brothers Have Gotten Offthe Ground?, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 315
(1999).
8In re Northfield Labs., 527 F. Supp. 2d at 784.
'MICHAEL L. KICHLINE & DAVID A. KOTLER, DECHERT SURVEY OF SECURITIES
FRAUD CLASS ACTIONS BROUGHT AGAINST LIFE SCIENCES COMPANIES 1 (2008),
http://www.dechert.com/library/SurveyofSecuritiesFraudCA_06-08.pdf. Accounting firm
PricewaterhouseCoopers presents similar figures, suggesting that pharmaceutical industry class
actions represented 9%, 13%, and 10% of federal securities class actions in 2006, 2007, and 2008,
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Although investor disappointments abound, bio-pharmas often avoid
securities liability because the Rule 1Ob-5 scienter requirement presents a
high burden of proof for plaintiffs in most securities fraud class
actions.'oHowever, the scienter requirement is far from an absolute safeguard
for bio-pharmas. Scienter has been held to include "recklessness," a concept
not far from gross negligence. One judge or jury's concept of gross
negligence (which is not actionable under Rule 1 Ob-5) may be another judge
or jury's concept of recklessness." Moreover, the complexities surrounding
analysis of clinical trials, coupled with a company's natural inclination to
trumpet early favorable test results, may provide enticing fodder for
plaintiffs' counsel when later studies discount the earlier prognostications.
Even if a bio-pharma succeeds at the motion to dismiss stage, substantial
time, energy, and costs have been incurred in defending a securities fraud
action, and the constant threat of litigation may adversely affect the free flow
of information regarding product development.
The complex nature of pharmaceutical and biotech products and the
high risks and rewards that attract investors have made this industry
unusually susceptible to securities fraud litigation. According to Dechert's
Survey of Securities Fraud Class Actions, litigation against "life sciences
companies" represented approximately 13% of the class actions in 2006,
14% in 2007, and 10% in 2008, figures that are well above the proportionate
number of bio-pharmas relative to all listed companies.'" Part II of this
article looks at the process of product development by pharmaceutical and
biotech companies, including the FDA approval process and the uncertainty
of the FDA response to clinical trial data provided by the company. Part III
considers the difficulty in applying securities laws to pharmaceutical and
biotech companies, in particular the lack of congruence between FDA and
SEC standards, the interpretation of test and adverse reaction results, and the
lack of judicial expertise in heavily scientific matters. It also considers the
competing needs of companies to disclose information to investors with the
need to avoid statements that could later be used as Plaintiffs Exhibit A if
projections based on early clinical data prove to be incorrect. Part IV
suggests reform through the increased use of court-appointed experts under
respectively. For 2009, the percentage increased to 14% of total filings, or 22 cases.
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2009 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 10-11 (2010),
http://10b5.pwc.com/PDFINY-10-0559%20SEC%20LIT/20STUDYV7%20PRINT.PDF.
1017 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009).
"See generally infra note 125 and accompanying text.
12KOTLER, DECHERT LLP, DECHERT SURVEY OF SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTIONS
BROUGHT AGAINST LIFE SCIENCES COMPANIES 1, 2 (2009), http://www.dechert.com/library/Sur
vey of SecuritiesFraudCA_4-09.pdf.
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the Federal Rules of Evidence, inherent judicial authority, and Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. These reforms will assist in ameliorating the costs and
risks imposed on bio-pharmas by securities fraud class actions.
II. THE PROCESS OF PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AND RECALL
A review of the extended and complex processes underlying drug
and product approvals is necessary in order to appreciate the disclosure
demands imposed on publicly-traded bio-pharmas during the application and
marketing periods. This Part II is a brief description of the application and
continuing review processes, bearing in mind that at every stage there are
highly sensitive disclosure concerns.
A. Regulation of Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Prior to FDA
Approval"
Modem day pharmaceuticals are both a treatment to prevent or cure
disease and a revenue generating product subject to strict regulation during
their costly development, testing, production, marketing, and distribution
processes. For each new pharmaceutical approved by the FDA, a company
will spend, on average, between $1.2 and $1.3 billion dollars on research
and development (R&D).14 This number has skyrocketed in recent years,
representing an increase of $500 million dollars since 2000." With the
exception of a few blockbuster drugs, the commercial success rate of
pharmaceuticals remains low. In fact, just two out of ten medicines ever
produce revenues that match or exceed average R&D costs.'" In the United
States, the average pharmaceutical firm will invest as much as five times
more in R&D than the average manufacturing firm."
The FDA was created under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act of 1938 (FDCA). The FDCA requires that manufacturers, rather than
1
3The process described in this section is specific to pharmaceuticals. Medical devices that
support or sustain human life undergo a similar approval process by the FDA. The process requires
a Premarket Approval (PMA) application which includes data on safety and effectiveness, including
required pre-clinical and clinical trial data. Information concerning medical device approval is
found in 21 C.F.R. § 814.20-47 (2009).
14Pharm. Research and Mfrs. Of Am., Pharmaceuticallndustry Profile 2009,38-39 (2009),
available. at. http://phrma.org/files/attachments/PhRMA%202009%2Profile%20FINAL.pdf.
"Id. at 39.
61d.
1
7Congressional Budget Office, Research andDevelopment in the Pharmaceutical Industry,
1, 9 (2006), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7615/10-02-DrugR-D.pdf.
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the FDA, prove the safety of a drug before it can be marketed." The FDCA
also authorizes factory inspections and established penalties for fraudulent
claims and misleading labels." Beginning in 1962, under the Kefauver-
Harris Amendment, manufacturers were required to show not only a drug's
safety for human use, but also a drug's efficacy through clinical
investigations by qualified researchers.20 Drug safety, quality, and efficacy
remain the three key tenets in FDA drug approval today.
The FDA approval process is divided into three stages - a pre-
clinical stage, a clinical stage, and a post-clinical stage. The pre-clinical
stage begins when a pharmaceutical company identifies a promising
molecule or compound that could be useful in treating a certain disease.21For
example, a researcher may identify an enzyme or protein that appears to be a
critical link in the disease process and focus on inhibiting that enzyme or
protein to create a treatment benefit." Once a particular molecule has been
identified, it is tested in laboratory studies with animal subjects.23 If
promising data is found in animal subjects, the company files an
Investigational New Drug application (IND)1 with the Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research (CDER) at the FDA. The IND application contains
information in three broad areas: Animal Pharmacology and Toxicology
Studies, Manufacturing Information, and Clinical Protocols which explain
proposed human trials.25 Once the IND is submitted, the company must wait
thirty calendar days before initiating any clinical trials while the FDA
reviews the application.26
If the FDA does not object, the manufacturer may commence
clinical trials. The trials occur in three phases. Phase I trials are aimed
primarily at establishing drug safety and pharmacology. 27 Typically, between
twenty and one-hundred healthy volunteers receive very low dosages of the
investigational treatment.28  On average, about two thirds of Phase I
1
8Martin S. Lipsky & Lisa K. Sharp, From Idea to Market: The Drug Approval Process, 14
J. AM. BD. OF FAMIY PRACT.362, 363 (2001).
91d.20ld. at 364.
21FDA, How Drugs are Developed andApproved(2009), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/Devel
opmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/default.htm.
22Lipsky & Sharp, supra note 18, at 364.
23See How Drugs are Developed and Approved, supra note 21.
2421 C.F.R. § 312 (2009)-see also FDA, Investigational New Drug (IND) Application
(2009), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandAp
proved/ApprovalApplications/InvestigationalNewDruglNDApplication/default.htm.
25IND Application, supra note 24, at 2.26Id
2721 C.F.R. § 312.21(a) (2009); see also Lipsky & Sharp, supra note 18, at 365.
28Lipsky & Sharp, supra note 18, at 365.
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compounds will be found safe enough to progress to Phase I."29 Phase II
clinical trials are used to determine whether a new drug is effective in
treating a particular ailment." This phase also tests the appropriate dosage,
method of drug delivery, and determines common short-term side effects."
Phase II trials enroll between 100 and 300 patients with the disease the drug
is intended to treat. If a drug is ineffective or produces extreme side effects
it will not move forward to Phase III testing.32
Phase III clinical trials aim to confirm previous findings in a larger
population, establish efficacy for a particular condition, provide data on
long-term side-effects, and consider additional population subsets.33 The
overall length of a Phase III trial is between two and ten years, depending on
the nature of the drug or treatment.34 The FDA has recognized that a lengthy
clinical trial period may be inappropriate for certain high-priority
medications, such as advanced HIV or cancer treatments. Where an unmet
need and serious disease exists the FDA may permit an expedited review
under the fast track, accelerated approval, or a priority review system.
If a drug remains promising after clinical trials, the company may
file a New Drug Application (NDA) with the FDA 3  asking for FDA
approval of a new pharmaceutical for sale and marketing in the U.S." The
29 1d
3021 C.F.R. § 312.2 1(b) (2008) ("Phase 2 includes the controlled clinical studies conducted
to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug for a particular indication or indications in patients with the
disease or condition under study ... .').
"Robert J. Meyer, Director, Office of Drug Evaluation II, FDA's Drug Approval Process
(2004), available at http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t04040l.html.
32Lipsky & Sharp, supra note 18, at 365.
"21 C.F.R. § 312.21(c) (2009) ("Phase 3 studies are expanded controlled and uncontrolled
trials. They are performed after preliminary evidence suggesting effectiveness of the drug has been
obtained. . . ."); see also Lipsky & Sharp, supra note 18, at 366.
34Lipsky & Sharp, supra note 18, at 366.
3
5Phase III testing may be significantly abbreviated if the FDA allows accelerated approval
by using a surrogate endpoint for the study. A surrogate endpoint is essentially a marker, like a
laboratory measurement or physical sign, used in clinical trials as an indirect or substitute
measurement representing a clinically meaningful outcome, such as survival or symptom
improvement. For example, CD4 cell counts could be used to measure the effectiveness of an
antiviral medication in treating HIV-infected patients, or tumor shrinkage could be a physical sign
representing the effectiveness of a cancer treatment. FDA, Fast Track, Accelerated Approval and
Priority Review (2009), http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ByAudience/ForPatientAdvocates/Sp
eedingAccesstolmportantNewTherapies/ucml28291.htm; see also Lipsky & Sharp, supra note 18,
at 366.
36Mary K. Olson, PDUFA and Initial U.S. Drug Launches, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH.
L. REV. 393, 396 (2009); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314 (2009).
"Aside from R&D costs the filing of an NDA is costly. Fees for an NDA requiring clinical
data in the 2010 fiscal year are $1,405,500. Prescription Drug User Fee Rates for Fiscal Year 2010,
74 Fed. Reg. 38,451, 38,455 (August 3, 2009).
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NDA includes information about human and animal studies and also
includes information about drug ingredients, the manufacturing process,
packaging, and labeling." FDA review teams of medical doctors, chemists,
statisticians, microbiologists, pharmacologists, and other experts use the
NDA to determine whether the drug meets safety, quality, and efficacy
standards." The FDA typically acts to approve or deny the application
within 365 days for a standard NDA, and within 180 days for an accelerated
NDA.40 If an NDA is approved, the drug may then be marketed in the
United States.4'
B. Regulation ofPharnaceuticals and Medical Devices After FDA
Approval
In the United States, approximately four billion prescriptions are
written each year and nearly 500,000 adverse events are reported.42Yet only a
fraction of a drug's possible reactions can be identified prior to public
marketing.43 This increases the importance of developing effective reporting
structures and proper pharmacovigilance after a drug is marketed. The FDA
has in place several pharmcovigilance practices including post-market
surveillance, risk management plans, post-market studies (also known as
Phase IV trials), and as a last resort, requests for product recalls."
1. Post-Market Surveillance and Adverse Event Reporting
Drug sponsors and consumers are the primary sources of post-
38FDA, New Drug Application (NDA) (2010), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentAp
provalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/NewDrugApplicatio
nNDA/default.htm.
39Olson, supra note 36, at 396.
"Drug approval time in the United States has fallen dramatically after introduction of the
Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) in 1992. PDUFA requires that pharmaceutical
manufacturers pay fees to the FDA along with their NDAs. The fees are used to provide employees
to process NDAs more rapidly. Olson, supra note 36, at 398-99. On September 27,2007, President
George W. Bush signed into law H.R. 3580, the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of
2007. This bill reauthorized the fees set forth in PDUFA. See FDA, Prescription Drug User Fee
Act (PDUFA) (2010), http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/UserFees/
PrescriptionDrugUserFee/default.htm; see also2l C.F.R § 314.100 (2009).
41Lipsky & Sharp, supra note 18, at 366.
42Laura B. Faden & Christopher-Paul Milne, Pharmacovigilance Activities in the United
States, European Union and Japan: Harmonic Convergence or Convergent Evolution?, 63 FOOD
DRUG L.J. 683, 683-84 (2008).
43LARS NOAH & BARBARA A. NOAH, LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 267 (Foundation Press 2002).
"See Lipsky & Sharp, supra note 18, at 366.
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market surveillance. Currently, drug sponsors are required to report adverse
drug experiences that occur after the drug is on the market.45 Within fifteen
days after receiving a report of a serious and unexpected adverse experience,
the drug sponsor must submit a "15-day Alert Report" to the FDA.46
Additional periodic reporting is also required every quarter for the first three
years after approval and annually after the third year.47 In addition to
mandatory reporting, the FDA has provided guidance to drug sponsors in
three risk management documents,48 including the FDA Good
Pharmacovigilance Practice and Pharmacoepidemiological Assessment.49
This document provides nonbinding recommendations on how to identify
and evaluate safety signals that are being received from the market and
recommends that drug sponsors conduct pharmacoepidemiologial studies,
patient registries, and surveys of patients and providers.o
In addition to sponsor reporting, the FDA's Office of Surveillance
and Epidemiology (OSE) collects information from health care professionals
and consumers using the MedWatch program, which is entered into the
Adverse Event Reporting System database (AERS)." The FDA is
responsible for bi-weekly screenings of AERS and must post quarterly
4'21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (2010); see also Faden & Milne, supra note 42, at 686 (2008).
46Serious adverse drug experiences are considered to be any adverse drug experience
occurring at any dose that results in any of the following outcomes: death, a life-threatening adverse
drug experience, inpatient hospitalization or prolongation of existing hospitalization, a persistent or
significant disability/ incapacity, or a congenital anomaly/birth defect. This list is not exclusive and
the FDA allows other events to be considered serious adverse drug experiences upon appropriate
medical judgment. Unexpected adverse drug experiences are any adverse drug experience that is not
listed in the current labeling for the drug product. This includes events that may be symptomatically
and pathophysiologically related to an event listed in the labeling, but differ from the event because
of greater severity or specificity. "Unexpected," as used in this definition, refers to an adverse drug
experience that has not been previously observed (i.e., included in the labeling) rather than from the
perspective of such experience not being anticipated from the pharmacological properties of the
pharmaceutical product. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(a) (2009); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(c).
4721 C.F.R. § 314.80(c)(2).
48See U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:
PREMARKETING RISK ASSESSMENT 2 (2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/a
c/05/briefmg/20054136bl_01_Premarket%2ORisk%2OAssessment.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF RISK
MINIMIZATION ACTION PLANS 1 (2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/0
5/briefing/2005- 136bl _03 Risk%20Minimization%20Action%20Plans.pdf [hereinafter
RISKMAPS]; U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:
GOOD PHARMACOVIGILANCE PRACTICES AND PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT1
(2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Regulatoryinformation/Guidances/UCM126
834.pdf [hereinafter GOOD PRACTICES].49GOD PRACTICES, supra note 48, at 1.
sold. at 12-17.
51FDA, Adverse Event Reporting System (AERS) (2009), http//www.fda.gov/Drugs/Guida
nceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/Surveillance/AdverseDrugEffects/default.htm.
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reports of safety risks identified in the last quarter.52 If a potential safety
concern is identified in the AERS, further evaluation might include
epidemiological studies or regulatory action to improve product safety and
protect the public health." Possible actions include updating a product's
labeling information, restricting the use of the drug, communicating new
safety information to the public, or, in rare cases, removing a product from
the market.54
2. Risk Management
The FDA can require a company to submit a Risk Evaluation and
Mitigation Strategy (REMS) plan for a drug if there is a need to ensure that
the benefits of a drug outweigh the risks associated with use of that drug."
The REMs includes mechanisms to limit known or potential risks like use of
a medication guide or a patient package insert. To assure safe use of
products, the REMs may "require health care providers that prescribe the
drug, and pharmacies, practitioners or healthcare settings that dispense the
drug to undergo special training or certification," and to provide for patient
enrollment in drug registry." The FDA is presently using this strategy to
increase preemptive safety. According to one drug safety expert, "[t]he FDA
has, during the past eight years of risk management and REMS programs,
moved beyond reacting to drug safety crises with new regulations to trying to
prevent crises before they happen."57 In lieu of a full REMS, the FDA may
recommend a voluntary Risk Management Action Plan (RiskMAP) for
products with increased risk benefit profiles." The elements of a REMS and
RiskMAP are similar, but the RiskMAP is entirely voluntary and is used
primarily to "meet specific goals and objectives in minimizing known risks
of a product while preserving its benefits.""
52See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act, H.R. 3580, 110th Cong. § 921
(2007).
s3AERS, supra note 51, at 1.
541d
"See 21 U.S.C. § 355-l(a)(1) (2006) (describing the Secretary's ability to require a
company to submit a risk evaluation and mitigation strategy).
s6Faden & Milne, supra note 42, at 687.
57FDA Shifts to Pre-Empting Drug Risks as REMS Program Reaches 'Terrible 2',
PRNEWSWIRE, Nov. 11, 2009, http://www.brietbart.com/artcile.php/id-pmw.20091111.PHO948
7&show articlel.
"See RISKMAPS, supra note 48, at 3-12 (explaining the role of RiskMAPs in risk
management and reasons for implementation).
"Id. at 5.
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3. Phase IV Trials
Phase IV trials, or post-marketing commitments, are primarily
conducted to study long-term effects of the product, to determine additional
risks, benefits, or optimal usages of the medication, or to study populations
that were underrepresented in clinical trials."0 These studies may be
voluntary or, under certain circumstances, mandated by the FDA." Phase IV
trials are often used as a condition for approval by the FDA and are agreed to
by the drug sponsor in order to get the drug to market.62 Other instances of
mandatory Phase IV trials include drugs that obtained accelerated approval,"
drugs approved only on the basis of animal efficacy data," or drugs approved
for adults before pediatric studies could be conducted."
4. Product Recall
The FDA recognizes two methods of recall-voluntary recall and
recall at the request of the FDA.6 Most drug recalls are voluntary and
initiated by the manufacturer or distributor after discovery of a serious
danger posed by the product." The FDA's principal role in a voluntary recall
"is to oversee a company's strategy and assess the adequacy of the recall,"
60See U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:
REPORTS ON STATUS OF POSTMARKETING STUDY COMMITMENTS IMPLEMENTATION OF
SECTION 130 OF THE FOOD AND DRUG MODERNIZATION ACT OF 1997, 1-6 (2006), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/Guidances/UCM
080569.pdf (providing background information on postmarket studies).
6See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, §
901(a), 121 Stat. 922, 926 (2007) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355-k (2008)) (expanding the FDA's
authority to require Phase IV trials by adding §505(o) to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act); see
also 21U.S.C. § 356b (2006) (permitting the FDA to monitor postmarketing study commitments).
6 2See 21 U.S.C. § 355(k) (2006), amended by 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3)-(5) (Supp. 1 2008)
(describing post-market requirements).
See, e.g., 21 C.F.R § 314.510 (2010) (setting forth the regulation that the FDA may
approve marketing for a new drug based on surrogate endpoint); see also 21 C.F.R § 314.530 (2009)
(setting forth the safety standards to which accelerated approval drugs must comply).
MSee 21 C.F.R § 314.610 (2010) (stating that if clinical studies in humans cannot be
conducted ethically, FDA may approve a drug solely on animal studies and require the sponsor to
conduct postmarket studies to verify safety and efficacy in humans).
See id. § 314.55 (2010) (requiring applicants of all new drugs likely to be used in pediatric
patients to demonstrate safety and efficacy in pediatric populations prior to approval, in some cases,
the FDA will grant deferral of this requirement and require the sponsor to conduct post-market
studies).
6 See id. § 7.40(b) (2010). See generally id.§§ 7.40-7.59 (explaining the FDA drug recall
policy and procedures).
See FDA 101: Product Recalls- From First Alert to Effectiveness Checks (2009),
available at http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm049070.htm.
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rather than to initiate the recall." The FDA generally requests a product
recall only in urgent situations. 9 For example, on March 30, 2007, the FDA
requested that Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation voluntarily cease the
marketing of Zelnorm, a drug used to treat Irritable Bowel Syndrome,
because of serious cardiovascular adverse events (e.g., angina, heart attacks,
and strokes) associated with the drug."
Throughout February and March 2007, Novartis reported to
the FDA the results of a new analysis of 29 short-term (1 -
3 months) randomized, controlled clinical trials of Zelnorm.
. . . Thirteen Zelnorm-treated patients (or 0.1%) had
confirmed cardiovascular ischemic events, and only 1
placebo-treated patient (or 0.01%) with an event."
The FDA concluded that for most patients the benefits of the drug no longer
outweighed the risks.72
C. The Pressure to Disclose During Product Development
At each stage of product development, bio-pharmas are faced with
sensitive and often difficult disclosure decisions. When an IND application
has been filed and clinical trials are ongoing, companies face pressure for
early and frequent releases of information regarding the results of clinical
trials." Mandatory disclosures may be required under the SEC periodic
reporting requirements or exchange disclosure requirements in addition to
voluntary disclosures in the form of press releases or publication of
information about what is in the product "pipeline."" Investors, like
68Id
"See 21 C.F.R. § 7.40(b) (describing Food and Drug Administration requested recall).
7oSee Press Release, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., FDA Announces Discontinued Marketing
of GU Drug, Selnorm, for Safety Reasons (March 30, 2007), available at
http://fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/2007/ucml 08879.htm.
71Id.
72See id; see also Matthew Herper, FDA to Novartis: Stop Selling Zelnorm, FORBES.COM,
Mar. 30, 2007, http://forbes.com/2007/03/30/novartis-fda-drug-biz-cx_mh
0330novartis_print.html.
73See Liora Sukhatme, Deterring Fraud: Mandatory Disclosure and the FDA Drug
Approval Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1218-22 (2007) (discussing pressures faced by
pharmaceutical companies).
74Seegenerally 21 C.F.R. § 314.430 (2010) (discussing availability of public disclosure). A
survey of major drug company's websites including: Merck, Pfizer, GlaxoSmithKline, Eli Lilly,
AstraZeneca, and Bristol-Myers Squibb revealed that each company has a section devoted to listing
what drugs are in its product development portfolio. The drugs are often categorized by stage in
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investment analysts, also have an insatiable appetite for information on the
next big breakthrough, causing persistent pressure upon bio-pharmas for
their latest evaluation of the accumulating data."
Disclosure concerns persist during the FDA evaluation process. The
FDA regularly communicates with applicants concerning scientific, medical,
and procedural issues that arise during the review process."6
Communications from the FDA may generate disclosure requirements
because NDA deficiencies or inquiries may be considered material to
investors." Even if a product is approved by the FDA, disclosure hazards
will continue to surface as adverse events are reported or post-marketing
commitments, like Phase IV trials, demonstrate unforeseen health risks. As
evidenced by such notorious post-FDA approved recalls as Vioxx or
Celebrex, a bio-pharma's exposure to significant securities laws claims is
never eliminated."
III. FACTORS AFFECTING BIO-PHARMA SUSCEPTIBILITY TO
SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS
There is no publicly-traded industry comparable to bio-pharmas with
regard to the uncertainties of risk-reward potentials." During the course of
product development there will be numerous ups and downs, testing
successes, interpreted and reinterpreted calculations, retesting projects,
product re-configurations, and usage reformulations prior to an NDA filing.
By this time the company has spent millions, and test results have been
development and type of indication (i.e., anemia, depression, pain, COPD), as well as what phase
certain drugs are in the product development pipeline.
"See Sukhatme, supra note 73, at 1216 (explaining investor interest).
21 C.F.R § 314.102(a) (2010) (describing the general principles of communication
between the FDA and applicants).
77Communication between the FDA and drug sponsors is not public information.
Communication in a response letter, for example that a drug is approvable or not approvable, may
give rise to disclosure obligations under the securities laws. See id. § 314.430 (2010) (covering
availability for public disclosure of data and information in an application or abbreviated
application); see also Sukhatme, supra note 73, at 1219-21 (recommending public disclosure of
FDA communications).
7See Jonathan V. O'Steen & Van O'Steen, The FDA Defense: Vioxx and the Argument
Against Federal Preemption of State Claims for Injuries Resulting From Defective Drugs, 48 ARIZ.
L. REV. 67, 67-70 (2006) (discussing the trend towards preemption of state claims when an FDA-
approved drug is the subject of the claim).
"The development of a new line of automobiles, for example, may be comparable in terms
of costs and time-lines, but once the automobile has been developed it is not subject to termination
based on agency suspension or unforeseen adverse health reactions. Even the exploding Pinto was
not withdrawn from the market, despite numerous tort actions. If manufacturers ultimately engage
in recalls, the automobiles remain in the market. On the contrary, product recalls for bio-pharmas
generally result in at least an extended, if not permanent, elimination of the product from the market.
[Vol. 35924
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sufficient to move forward but not conclusive as to eventual success."o The
bio-pharma may think that it is onto a major new product, but the company
knows that there are numerous hurdles to clear before fruition. Disclosure
concerns become even more sensitive once the company files an NDA. The
FDA review process can take anywhere from months to years. The company
has no control over FDA timing, yet the investing public is eager to learn
every bit of progress."' The bio-pharma is also in a state of uncertainty.
FDA communications with the company, which are confidential, may be
pointed and sometimes negative, but do not necessarily indicate an end
result.82 The bio-pharma is caught between wanting to express confidence in
its research capacities and not wanting to overly-excite potential investors.
Yet disclosure is demanded. If, in hindsight, the company's initial
announcements are too negative, the SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur scenario
might arise for disappointed stock sellers." If the company was too positive,
disappointed buyers will constitute the class.84
FDA product or device approval is a major milestone, yet it is
simply one step along the continuum of disclosure risks and concerns. FDA
and company monitoring of potential adverse reactions and unintended
effects is a never-ending process that could lead to swift and surprising
market recalls. The FDA may recommend recalls without evidence of actual
harmful effects in order to further evaluate a product." If even a temporary
recall occurs, stock prices may be affected and it will be difficult to
resuscitate a product's market position, leaving the company once again
vulnerable to litigation by disappointed investors."
8 See Sukhatme, supra note 73, at 1218 ("The cost of developing a single prescription drug
(from initial research to final FDA approval) has been estimated to range from $800 million to $1.7
billion, and the time to market for a single pharmaceutical product may take as long as fifteen
years.").
See id. at 1217 (describing investor's behavior).
82See id. at 1221 (quoting acting FDA Commissioner as saying "the policy of the FDA is to
reveal nothing").
83See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 863-64 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that an
injunction may be issued if a company releases misleading statements which are meant to affect the
company's market price).
84See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
85E.g., Jennifer Corbett Dooren & Jared A. Favole, FDA Calls for Temporary Halt in Use
of Glaxo's Rotavirus Vaccine, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2010, at D6 ("The Food and Drug
Administration recommended Monday that doctors temporarily stop using GlaxoSmithKline PLC's
Rotarix child vaccine after parts of an extraneous virus were found in the product .... The FDA said
that while there is currently no evidence of a safety risk associated with the vaccine, it needed to
learn more.").
86See, e.g., GlaxoSmithKline Profit Plunges After Avandia, Paxil Legal Costs, THE
FINANcIAL, July 10, 2010, available at http://fmchannel.com/newsflash/Pharmacy/67833_Glaxo
SmithKlineProfitPlungesAfterAvandia,_PaxilLegalCosts/ (noting that Rotarix stock was
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A. Disclosure Pressures and Obligations
Pressure for early and frequent release of information regarding
product development comes from several sources:
(1) SEC Periodic Reporting Requirements
The Form 10-Q and Form 10-K both require 1934 Act
reporting companies to include Management's Discussion
and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations." Although much of that information is
explanatory as to past results, Instruction 3 to Item 303(a)
requires the discussion to "focus specifically on material
events and uncertainties known to management that would
cause reported financial information not to be necessarily
indicative of future operating results or of future financial
condition."" This is a call for soft, forward-looking
information, exactly the type of information that might be
suitable for products in the development stage with high
potential revenue-generating capacities.
(2) Exchange Disclosure Requirements
Publicly-listed companies are expected to provide to the
investing public a continuous disclosure of material
information. The New York Stock Exchange Manual, for
example, states that, "[a] listed company is expected to
release quickly to the public any news or information which
might reasonably be expected to materially affect the
market for its securities."" Early test results for bio-pharma
products may well be material, given the enormous costs
sunk into research and the high market interest in potential
outcomes. Bio-pharmas may justifiably conclude that
securities laws concerns obligate them to make early and
ongoing public announcements well before additional and
more definitive clinical trials are completed.
(3) Regulation FD
Market analysts and others involved in the securities
industry put enormous pressure on publicly-traded
significantly impacted by the FDA recall).
"See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2010) (describing the Management's Discussion and Analysis
of Financial Condition and Results of Operations inclusion of forward-looking statements).
"Id. at instruction 3.
89New York Stock Exchange Manual, § 202.5, available at http://www.nysemanual.ny
se.com.
[Vol. 35926
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companies to disclose pending developments, projections,
and other information that may not have yet been publicly
disclosed. That is their job and they do it well. So well, in
fact, that the SEC felt compelled to issue Regulation FD to
assure that market-sensitive information is not selectively
disclosed."o With bio-pharmas, the inquiries can be
particularly intense as potential products move from early
to later clinical trials and then to potential formal marketing
approval by the FDA. Company press releases, which may
have been carefully couched in cautionary language, may
generate a flood of inquiries regarding the facts behind the
release, company projections, and current testing
programs." Bio-pharma executives cannot readily shut off
such inquiries, as the companies need to maintain solid
relationships with Wall Street for capital resource purposes.
Answers to inquiries however may inadvertently reveal
material information that must, pursuant to Regulation FD,
be disclosed to the public.92 The result may be an even
more heated market than is merited or intended.
The disclosure obligations noted above raise uniquely sensitive
concerns for bio-pharmas by reason of market pressures, factual
uncertainties, potential government intervention, and length of time during
which all of these factors exist. Exacerbating these factors is the fact that
clinical trial results and evaluations often run into the thousands of pages and
9oSee Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, [2000
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,319, at 83,676 (Aug. 15, 2000). Regulation FD is
set forth at 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-103 (2009).
9 tSee William 0. Fisher, Key Disclosure Issues for Life Sciences Companies: FDA Product
Approval, Clinical Test Results, and Government Inspections, 8 MICH. TELECOMM.& TECH. L.
REv. 115, 117 (2001-2002) ("The recent adoption of Regulation FD emphasizes that life sciences
companies must communicate information on . . . key subjects directly, often making
announcements in these critical areas to a market that has not been alerted by analysts who have
anticipated the news. All of this increases the pressure on biotech executives who address the
investment community.").
92Regulation FD requires that if there is an intentional disclosure of material information to
securities professionals, meaning that the person making the disclosure either knew, or was reckless
in not knowing, that the information is both material and nonpublic, the company must make a
simultaneous public disclosure. If the disclosure is unintentional, meaning that the person making
the disclosure did not know or was not reckless in not knowing, that the information was material
and nonpublic, the company must make public disclosure promptly, meaning within 24 hours after
initial disclosure or commencement of the next day's trading. 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100(a), 2 4 3 .101(a),
(d).
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contain scientific and research data readily subject to alternative
interpretations. Yet the bio-pharma must distill this voluminous and multi-
faceted information into short, comprehensible press releases and statements
for the investment community. Inherent within this process is that not all
information will be disclosed, as judgments are made as to current
interpretations and potential materiality.
The bio-pharma's disclosure dilemma is illustrated by a class action
brought against a pharmaceutical that, having announced favorable Phase II
results, subsequently announced that preliminary Phase III results were not
favorable." Plaintiffs argued that the Phase II announcement was misleading
because it failed to reveal numerous allegedly material factors and results.94
The court dismissed plaintiffs' charges in an opinion that was perceptive yet
somewhat troubling:
The securities laws do not impose a requirement that
companies ... who report information from imperfect studies
include exhaustive disclosures of procedures used, including
alternatives that were not utilized and various opinions with
respect to the effects of these choices on the interpretation of
the outcome data. . . . Reasonable minds could difer with
respect to the value of the Colorado [Phase II] study in
determining the therapeutic effects of Auriculin. Reasonable
minds cannot conclude, however, that defendants' failure to
exhaustively catalogue those possibilities was fraudulent."
Although the defendant bio-pharma won, the court's reference to
reasonable minds differing provides cold comfort, as a different judge may
have reasonably concluded that the value of the Phase II study was so
affected by the omitted information that the defendant's motion to dismiss
could not be granted. The latter conclusion is precisely what occurred in In
93Padnes v. Scios Nova Inc., No. C 95-1693 MHP, 1996 WL 539711, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
18, 1996).
94Scios Nova was testing a drug to treat acute renal failure. A press release issued after a
Phase 11 study stated that the drug had demonstrated a statistically significant reduction in the need
for dialysis. The preliminary Phase m results failed to confirm that the drug reduced the need for
dialysis. Plaintiffs argued that the company failed to reveal Phase II results showing that (a) the drug
did not increase urine flow rates, (b) it had no substantial effect on glomerular filtration or changes
in serum creatinine, (c) different dosages and routes of administration were used, (d) a higher
percentage of control-group patients received vasopressors, and (e) diuretics were not administered
to control-group patients after the first 24 hours. Plaintiffs also challenged that the dialysis results
were statistically significant. Id. at *2.
95Id. at *5 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 35928
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re Biogen Securities Litigation," in which plaintiffs sued on the basis of a
press release following preliminary Phase II trials stating that the test results
looked "very good" and that "we have a very large potential market for the
drug."" The statements were not based on the endpoint results as initially
conceived for the study, which had not been met, but rather were based on a
post-study conclusion that the drug provided other unanticipated favorable
results." It was on this basis that the company issued its optimistic
statements. Plaintiffs' challenge could well have been dismissed by some
judges, as in the Scios Nova case," on the ground that reasonable minds
might have differed as to the value of the Phase II study but that the
optimistic evaluation based on a post-study change in direction was not
fraudulent. That was not the court's conclusion, however, as it denied
defendants' motion for summary judgment based upon the failure to disclose
that the study's primary endpoint as initially conceived was not realized.'"
These fine distinctions are forced upon courts by the complexities of the
multiple analyses processes inherent in the bio-pharma industry.
B. The Disclosure Trigger: Materiality or Statistically Significant?
Complicating the analysis paradigm for bio-pharmas is the issue of
materiality. Whether a particular event is material can often be a borderline
call for any company, but the question is especially difficult for bio-pharmas.
Two factors exacerbate the difficulty. One is the serious health concerns that
are at issue. Given the public's sensitivity to health concerns, when do
adverse health results become material? Is one death sufficient to raise
concerns? The materiality concerns when health is at stake are in a much
different class than claims that financial statements are misleading or that
facts regarding merger negotiations have been improperly withheld. Death
and drug-related illness have low levels of public tolerance. If materiality is
judged by what the reasonable person would consider important in making
an investment decision, the public intolerance to adverse health reports may
create a materiality issue even though, from the bio-pharma's more scientific-
oriented perspective, there is still much more data to be collected.
The bio-pharma's perspective leads to the second difficulty in
assessing materiality. The entire process of drug or product development is
96In re Biogen Sec. Litig., 179 F.R.D. 25 (D. Mass. 1997).
971d. at 30-31.
98Id.
"See generally Padnes v. Scios Nova Inc., 1996 WL 539711, (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 1996).
'"In re Biogen Sec. Litig., 179 F.R.D. at 39.
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founded on tests and trials that provide "statistically significant"'1 evidence
that it is not chance but rather the drug or product that is causing the desired
results. Moreover, and here is where substantial litigation arises, once the
drug or product is in the market and unexpected adverse health events begin
to appear, the bio-pharma must determine whether those results are
"statistically significant" to warrant public disclosure, recall, or suspension.o2
This is an especially difficult task, as the adverse event numbers are
generally in low fractions of total usage. Moreover, the users of the drugs or
products are often in a weakened condition to begin with and it may not be
clear whether the apparent adverse results are due to the drug or are
"opportunistic" consequences of pre-existing conditions.'o Bio-pharmas
make their determinations based on statistically significant results following
analysis of substantial scientific data. Yet, statistical significance is not the
same as the securities' law standard of materiality.
The lack of congruence between the securities' law standard of
"materiality" and the bio-pharmas' "statistically significant" testing standards
was illustrated in In re Pfizer, Inc. Securities Litigation,'" a class action
brought by Pfizer shareholders based on allegedly misleading statements by
01Tests of statistical significance are used to determine whether a relationship exists
between two variables. A statistical analysis proceeds by testing a "null hypothesis" that there is no
relationship between two variables against an "alternative hypothesis" that some specified
relationship exists. The generally accepted confidence interval in scientific studies is ninety-five
percent, meaning that a study is not statistically significant unless the "null hypothesis" of no
relationship can be excluded with ninety-five-percent confidence. This means that the probability
the observed finding occurring by chance is not greater than 5 times out of 100 (a p-level of 0.05).
See generally LEE BURCHINAL, METHODS FOR SOCIAL RESEARCHERS IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 1, 511 (2008), http://srmde.net/stmdc_022208.pdf.
102Medical device and drug manufacturers need not disclose isolated reports of
harm suffered by users of their products until those reports provide statistically
significant evidence that the ill effects may be caused by-rather than randomly
associated with-use of the products and are sufficiently serious and frequent to
affect future earnings.
Plumbers & Pipefitters Local Union 719 Pension Fund v. Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 673 F.
Supp. 2d 718, 741 (S.D. Ind. 2009) (quoting In re Medtronic Inc., Sec. Litig., 618 F.Supp.2d 1016,
1023 (D. Minn. 2009)).
1o3Attempting to determine whether adverse events were caused by the administered drug or
by the already weakened physical condition of the patients (the latter being so-called "opportunistic"
results) is one of the most difficult and challenging problems facing bio-pharmas and the FDA. In a
class action against Biogen, Idec, Inc. based on the drug Tysabri that was pulled from the market
after some adverse event reports, including deaths by multiple sclerosis users, the FDA's Deputy
Director of Neurology Products stated "[wle were not impressed that the overall mortality rate was
markedly different than [what] we might expect in MS studies." N.J. Carpenters Pension & Annuity
Funds v. Biogen IDEC Inc., 537 F.3d 35, 50 (1st Cir. 2008). In other words, the FDA's conclusion
was that the totality of the adverse events was more likely based on opportunistic results rather than
caused by the administered drug. This, however, is an area rife with difficult line-drawing.
1In re Pfizer, Inc. Sec. Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
930 [Vol. 35
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Pfizer over a five-year period regarding its Bextra and Celebrex drug
products.'o5 Three studies conducted by Pfizer during the five-year period
had each indicated adverse cardiovascular events associated with the
drugs.'o6 When the negative results were finally revealed, the FDA directed
that Bextra be removed from the market and a "black box" warning be put
on Celebrex's label.o' A drop in Pfizer's share price immediately followed.'
In the ensuing Rule 1 Ob-5 litigation, Pfizer's motion to dismiss asserted that
the withheld information regarding the test results was not material because
the results were not statistically significant.' Pfizer cited In re Carter-
Wallace Inc. Securities Litigation, in which the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals stated: "[d]rug companies need not disclose isolated reports of
illnesses suffered by users of their drugs until those reports provide
statistically significant evidence that the ill effects may be caused by-rather
than randomly associated with-use of the drugs and are sufficiently serious
and frequent to affect future earnings.""0
Having based its argument on the lack of statistical significance,
Pfizer asked the court to take judicial notice that 5% is the commonly
regarded threshold for the statistically significant standard."' The court
refused, noting that: "[i]t is one thing to take notice of the fact that an author
has written that 5% is the threshold for statistical significance. It is quite
another thing entirely to use that 5% figure as a basis for rejecting the
significance of complicated medical studies."ll 2
Having rejected the dominance of the statistically significant
standard, the court needed to emphasize that In re Carter- Wallace and
similar decisions cited by Pfizer did not substitute a statistically significance
standard for the more abstract materiality standard: "[a]lthough the Carter-
05Id. at 629-30.
07
"A black box warning is the most negative warning the FDA uses, and is the last step
before a drug is pulled from the market." Id. at 631.
'
0
"During the Class Period, Pfizer's stock rose to a high of $47.44 per share before falling
to $21.09." In re Pfizer, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 631.
'
09
"Defendants .. . contend that they had no duty to disclose the results of the three studies
at the core of Plaintiffs' complaint because the results were not statistically significant and thus were
immaterial." Id. at 633; accord Siracusano v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 585 F.3d 1167, 1178 (9th
Cir. 2009) (concluding that "the district court erred in relying on the statistical significance standard
to conclude that Appellants failed adequately to allege materiality").
1 oln re Pfizer Inc., Sec. Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d at 633 (quoting In re Carter Wallace, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 150 F.3d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1998)). Pfizer also relied upon Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d
275 (3d Cir. 2000), holding that undisclosed adverse reports had not provided statistically significant
information.
"'In re Pfizer Inc. Sec. Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d at 634.
1121d
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Wallace and Oran decisions stand for the proposition that isolated adverse
event reports, lacking statistical significance, do not prove that a drug is
unsafe,.. . the decisions 'do not hold that adverse event reports are always
immaterial."""
Other courts have similarly noted that omitted information may be
material for securities law purposes even in the absence of statistically
significant evidence." 4 If statistical significance, the measuring rod for
fundamental decisions in the bio-pharma industry, is not the equivalent of
materiality, the disclosure standard for securities law purposes, case law has
created a liability trap for bio-pharmas who rely upon statistical evidence. If
test results or adverse reports can be characterized, contemporaneously or in
hindsight, as statistically significant, using industry measures, materiality is
proven. But if such results or reports cannot be so characterized, materiality
may nevertheless be present depending upon a court's judgment as to
severity and impact. The clear clash between the ostensibly objective,
numerically based standard of the bio-pharma industry and the amorphous
standard of the securities laws presents an enormous liability risk to the bio-
pharmas."
The statistical significance-materiality dichotomy may be heading
towards resolution. In Siracusano v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc.," plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant pharmaceutical company engaged in
misrepresentations and withheld accumulating adverse event reports. The
company was well aware of the reports but, during the critical period,
publicly denied their statistical significance."" The District Court, choosing
13Id. at 636 (quoting In re Bayer AG Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ.1546 WHP, 2004 WL
2190357, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2004)).
4In re Elan Corp. Sec. Litig., 543 F. Supp. 2d 187, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that
omitted information "may become material even in the absence of statistically significant evidence in
light of other indications that the risk associated with adverse . .. events is legitimate and serious
enough to threaten ... sales").
"
5The facts in In re Carter- Wallace, Inc. Securities Litigation, illustrate the disclosure
dilemma caused by adverse event reports. Carter-Wallace had received reports of six deaths during a
five month period related to the use of its drug, Felbatol. Only when four more deaths occurred in a
single month did the company advise the FDA. In the ensuing litigation, the court noted that the
four deaths occurring in a single month prompted the disclosure and that "the earlier reports are not
by themselves sufficient to support inferences of either actual knowledge or recklessness." In re
Carter-Wallace, Inc. Sec. Litig., 150 F.3d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1998). By what standard did the court
make its conclusion? Six deaths over five months were not material until there was added four
deaths within a month. Other courts might well have found that the prior six deaths were material.
If there is no numerical standard, how is a company to judge its liability risks while assessing the
impact of incoming data?
"Siracusano v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 585 F. 3d 1167 (9' Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130
S. Ct. 3411 (June 14, 2010).
"
7 Following an article in the Dow Jones Newswires referring to FDA concerns and lawsuits
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to apply the statistically significant standard adopted by the Second Circuit
in In re Carter Wallace, Inc. Securities Litigation, dismissed the Rule 1 0b-5
complaint, finding that there was no materiality because the number of
adverse events was not "statistically significant.""'
The 9h Circuit reversed, holding that "the district court erred in
relying on the statistical significance standard to conclude that Appellants
failed adequately to allege materiality.""' In rejecting the statistical
significance standard, the 9th Circuit focused on what it referred to as a "fact-
specific inquiry" to determine materiality, based on what a reasonable
investor would have considered significant.'20 The court then went on to
recount nine instances of adverse events reported to Matrixx over a 4 1/2
year period, concluding that these reports were sufficient to meet pleading
standards for materiality. In June, 2010, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. The split among the circuits regarding the appropriate materiality
standard is the apparent basis for the Court's acceptance of the case.
If the Supreme Court sides with Matrixx and bio-pharma advocates
for the statistical significant standard,12' a major uncertainty in Rule 1Ob-5
litigation may be resolved. It should not be supposed that judicial
acceptance of a statistical standard, however, will necessarily relieve bio-
pharmas of litigation concerns. Experts will continue to argue over statistics,
whether they are reliable, whether they represent proper subsets of data, and
whether the so-called adverse events are in fact the result of the particular
drug or device instead of other factors. Courts will continue to be faced with
a plethora of data and conflicting expert interpretations. Our concern
regarding judicial competence in this arena, discussed more fully in Part IV,
is not likely to be substantially alleviated regardless of which way the
statistical significant-materiality dichotomy is resolved.
C. The Scienter Defense: Not Always What It's Cracked Up To Be
Rule 1 Ob-5's scienter requirement is plaintiffs principal burden and
the main reason for dismissal of class action litigation. In Dechert's survey
of 25 securities fraud class actions filed against bio-pharmas in 2007, as of
filed against Matrixx, the company issued a press release stating that "[t]he overall incidence of
adverse events associated with zinc gluconate was extremely low, with no statistically significant
difference between the adverse event rates for the treated and placebo subsets." 585 F. 3d at 1173.
"'Id. at 1178.
"
91d.
120 d. The "fact-specific inquiry" phrase was taken from Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224, 240 (1988).
121At least four pharmaceutical industry groups have filed amicus curiae briefs in support of
the statistical significant standard for purposes of Rule lOb-5 materiality determination. See 42 Sec.
Reg. L. Rep. 1675 (BNA) (Sept. 3, 2010).
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April 2009, motions to dismiss for lack of sufficiently pled scienter had
succeeded in 11 cases, and such motions were pending in eight other cases.12
If the motions are granted in only half of the eight cases, that would result in
15 of the 25 cases, 60%, being dismissed for lack of well-pled scienter.
Plaintiff s burden is heightened by the pleading requirements of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which imposed on plaintiffs suing
under Rule 1 Ob-5, the requirement that the complaint "shall, with respect to
each act or omission alleged. . . , state with particularity facts giving rise to a
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind." 23
The double whammy of scienter and rigorous pleading standards provides a
substantial barrier to plaintiffs' actions surviving the motion to dismiss
stage.124
Despite the formidable obstacles that plaintiffs face in adequately
pleading scienter, a chink in defendants' armor exists because of the
unanimous circuit court adoption of recklessness as a substitute for the more
demanding intent requirement of scienter.125 Recklessness is a difficult
allegation to plead and prove, but it has one enormous advantage over strict
scienter, namely that it is not dependent on the actor's state of mind.126 There
is a universe of difference between proving intent to deceive and proving
that the materiality of the facts was so obvious that defendants must have
122KOTLER, supra note 12, at 4.
123Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737,
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.). 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006).
124The heightened pleading standards do not apply to enforcement actions by the SEC. See
SEC v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 363 F. Supp. 2d 708, 717 (D.N.J. 2005) ("[T]he heightened
requirements for pleading scienter under PSLRA do not apply to actions brought by the SEC."),
accord SEC v. ICN Pharms., Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1099 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
125 When the Supreme Court adopted scienter as the culpability standard for Rule 1Ob-5, it
left the door open to whether recklessness could qualify within the scienter standard. Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n. 12 (1976) ("In this opinion the term 'scienter' refers to a mental
state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. In certain areas of the law recklessness is
considered to be a form of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act. We
need not address here the question whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient
for civil liability under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5."). There is now unanimous acceptance among
district and circuit courts that recklessness meets the scienter standard. See, e.g.,cases discussed in
Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, What Constitutes Recklessness Sufficient to Show Necessary
Element ofScienter in Civil Action for Damages Under 10(b) ofSecurities Exchange Act of 1934
(15 USCS § 78j(b)) and Rule l0b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 49 A.L.R.
FED.392 (1980).
126An oft-quoted definition of recklessness sets forth the following elements: (1) a highly
unreasonable omission, (2) involving not merely simple, or even excusable negligence, but an
extreme departure from standards of ordinary care, (3) which presents a danger of misleading buyers
or sellers, and (4) that is either known to defendant or is so obvious that defendant must have been
aware of it. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977) (citing
Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Okla. 1976)).
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been aware of it.' Once materiality is sufficiently alleged to get past the
motion to dismiss stage, it might not be an arduous path to prove that
defendant must have been aware of the danger and thus acted beyond
excusable negligence. Even a good faith belief that the results of clinical
trials or adverse event reports are not material may not preclude a finding of
recklessness where a court concludes that the belief is not sufficiently
justified by the totality of facts.'28
Moreover, as recklessness edges away from intent, one court's view
of excusable negligence may be another's perception of inexcusable
recklessness.'29 While this blurring of standards is applicable to all Rule
lob-5 defendants, it is particularly sensitive for bio-pharmas whose public
statements can never be more than a mere fraction of the mountainous,
detailed results and analyses that precede such announcements.'30 Once a
class action is commenced, press releases and other public statements are
subjected to scrutiny based upon such voluminous background material.
Discrepancies, overly optimistic projections, allegedly material omissions,
and even internal interpretive disagreements'' may be readily found when
the thousands of pages of underlying materials are reviewed; especially as
127See, e.g., In re PLC Sy., Inc. Sec. Litig., 41 F. Supp. 2d 106, 115 (D. Mass. 1999)
("Moreover, plaintiffs allege that defendants knowingly or recklessly made reassuring statements
about The Heart Laser's approval track at the FDA when in the absence of complete data, they knew
or should have known that FDA approval, at least in the projected time frame, was highly
improbable.") (emphasis added).
128SEC v. Infinity Group Co., 212 F.3d 180, 192 (3d Cir. 2000) ("good faith, without more,
does not necessarily preclude a finding of recklessness").
129E.g., Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978), amended,
Nos. 77-7104, 77-7124, 1978 WL 4098, at * 1 (2d Cir. 1978) (Rule I Ob-5 liability found, contrary to
dissenting opinion that defendants engaged only in negligent conduct).
1
30In at least one bio-pharma case the volume of records was the principal factor in
transferring the case from New York to the defendant's home state of Georgia. In reAtheroGenics
Sec. Litig., No. 05 Civ. 00061, 2006 WL 851708, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2006) (". . . the
'voluminous documentation' surrounding the AGI- 1067 clinical trials, among other documentation,
are available in defendant's sole office in Alpharetta.").
'3 tFisher, supra note 91, at 152.
whatever positive, selective disclosure a life sciences company makes about
clinical results, that disclosure will reflect the company's interpretation of the
results. That interpretation will emerge from an internal dialogue. During that
dialogue, different professionals may express different views. If so, some views
may be rejected after internal consideration. The inconsistent views may remain in
company filed, however, and shareholders may later contend that ... those views
show that the company's announced interpretation was 'false' and that the company
knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that its interpretation was misleading.
Id. Fisher cited In re Synergen Securities Litigation, 863 F. Supp. 1409 (D. Colo. 1994) as
an example where conflicting internal reports resulted in a court's denial of the defendant company's
motion to dismiss.
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such review is done in hindsight with the benefit of knowing that the
seemingly insignificant risk has now materialized. What should have been
said becomes controlling, and the volumes of test results and analyses
conducted over an extended period provide ample opportunity for plaintiffs
to find nuggets that arguably should have been disclosed.'32
The disclosure dilemmas facing bio-pharmas, particularly the
dangers of early press releases when measured by hindsight scrutiny, is
illustrated by the PLC Systems litigation."' PLC had developed a laser
device for use in heart operations on patients with end-stage coronary artery
disease"'. An initial press release following a clinical trial lauded the device
for having reduced the mortality rate for treatment of such patients. The
press release was silent, however, as to whether there was any improvement
in patient perfusion,'s a major goal of the device, as PLC did not regard the
early test results on this matter as statistically significant. A subsequent
press release did reveal a statistically significant increase in perfusion.
However, the failure to have included any reference to perfusion in the initial
release was held to be actionable under Rule lOb-5."6 The court's
conclusion reflects the exquisite line-drawing forced upon courts by
uncertain standards and upon defendants in the bio-pharma industry:
The failure to disclose the fact that the six month data showed
no significant improvement in perfusion, the study's primary
endpoint, is more troubling, as the absence of any such
improvement might signify to a sophisticated investor that
TMR offered no long term benefit to end-stage patients
generally. The Amended Complaint does not allege that PLC
concealed negative data, but that it failed to disclose that the
six month data did not, at least yet, show a statistically
meaningful increase in perfusion. One might fairly, without a
fuller explanation of the study's protocol, regard the absence
of a positive result in perfusion to be an adverse finding....
While the issue is close, . . . I conclude that the failure to
1321n re Pfizer, Inc. Sec. Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 621, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (". . . the
significance the parties perceive in the report turns on whether the relevant data set of clinically
relevant adverse events is to be broken down by sub-group or assessed in the aggregate.").
1 In re PLC Systems, Inc. Sec. Litig., 41 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D. Mass. 1999).
134 at 108.
135"Perfusion is the act of 'forcing blood or other fluid to flow from the artery through the
vascular bed of tissue."' Id. at 111 n.l (citing Stedman's Medical Dictionary 1325 (26th ed. 1995)).
1Id. at 120.
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disclose the perfusion results ... is actionable."'
One might wonder whether into the potential liability equation there
should be added the investment judgments made and foreseeable risks
accepted by plaintiff class members. During the pre-FDA approval process,
investors are making a bet on the future, just as are the companies who
continue to pour millions of dollars into the ensuing trials and FDA
applications. Both investors and companies are hoping for favorable
outcomes for which neither can be sure, yet the risk of continuing investment
and continuing research costs is worth the enormous rewards, should there
be eventual success."' We should not suppose that investors in bio-pharmas
who are motivated by the potential of new medical devices and new drugs
are unaware of the risks or are so naive as to think that early favorable
results, indeed even early favorable prognostications, are anything more than
hopeful signs."' And when those hopeful signs fail to materialize, to the
great disappointment of both the investors and the company, is it appropriate
that the company alone suffers economic loss while investors, who are well
aware of the high risk-benefit paradigm for bio-pharmas, seek recovery
"'In re PLC Systems, 41 F. Supp.2d at 120. One might also wonder how realistic the court
was in believing that investors who purchased PLC shares after the press release were in fact misled
by the absence of any reference to perfusion. The conclusion that the omission was material and
misleading assumes investors who were aware of the perfusion concept, acted upon the absence of
reference to it.
138See, e.g., Thomas Gryta, Drug Firm Seeks Alzheimer's Breakthrough --- Late Stage Data
for Medivation's Dimebon Awaited; Treatment Could Yield Billions of Dollars, New Option for
Patients, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2010, at B4B.
Medivation Inc. is expected to report late-stage data for its experimental
Alzheimer's disease treatment, Dimebon, by mid-year ... in what will be the
second test of the drug's effectiveness.... Success in the trial could lift shares
to $80, . . . while its failure could send them down to $15. Shares of
Medivation closed at $32.27 on Tuesday.
Id. The risk-reward paradigm of bio-pharma securities may be contrasted with other
industries where unexpected announcements do not result in similar stock price volatility. Seee.g.,
Vanessa Fuhrmans & Christoph Rauwald, Daimler Posts Loss, Cancels Dividend, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 19, 2010, at B2 (Daimler reported a "surprise fourth-quarter net loss and cancelled its dividend
for the first time in 14 years, . . . [catching] investors off guard," yet its share price dropped only 5%
on the day.); see also In re Nuvelo, Inc. Sec. Litig., 668 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1225 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(disclosing a drug failed phase 3 trials, caused Nuvelo's stock price to fall from the previous day's
close of $19.55 to $4.05 per share).
139For example, the offending press release in the In re PLC Systems Securities Litigation,
41 F. Supp. 2d 106, 113 (D. Mass. 1999), contained the following disclaimer: "Note: Certain of the
above statements may be forward-looking statements that involve risks and uncertainties. In such
instances, actual results could differ materially as a result of a variety of factors including
competitive developments and risk factors listed from time to time in the Company's SEC reports."
The release also stated that "PLC Systems hopes TMR will one day be utilized as a treatment for the
various stages of coronary artery disease." Id. at 109 (emphasis added).
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through monetary damages?'40 Sometimes, some degree of monetary
recovery is appropriate. In Part IV, we address various forms of bio-pharma
litigation and suggest reforms that may at least cause a pause in the race to
the courthouse where there is a substantial accumulation of scientific
evidence. 4'
D. Safe Harbor for Projections: Important But Limited Protection
Rule 1 Ob-5 actions against bio-pharmas have frequently been based
on forward-looking statements, such as predictions of the value of potential
products or the timing or potential approval by the FDA. Inasmuch as stock
market movements are largely influenced by predictions, forward-looking
statements by bio-pharmas are especially sensitive given the enormous risk-
benefit potentials. To the extent that bio-pharma company public statements
can be characterized as projections, additional protection from class action
litigation is provided by the safe harbor provision inserted into the 1934 Act
by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.'42 The provisions went
beyond the protections afforded by the judicially developed "bespeaks
caution" doctrine. 43 Forward-looking statements, defined to include
financial projections and plans regarding products, enjoy a safe harbor from
Rule 1 Ob-5 liability if either (i) "accompanied by meaningful cautionary
statements identifying important factors that could cause actual results to
differ materially from those in the forward-looking statement,"'" or (ii)
plaintiff fails to prove that the person making the statement had "actual
knowledge" of its false or misleading nature.'45 The cautionary statement
defense is similar to the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, but, in the absence of
such cautionary language, the requirement that plaintiff prove actual
140A distinction could appropriately be made for company disclosures in a capital-raising
endeavor, such as an IPO or private offering. In those instances, the company is seeking the
assistance of investors to fund the device or product and all conceivable risks should be fully
disclosed. When share purchases of bio-pharmas are made in the secondary market, both the
company and investors are using their own funds and companies have much less to gain by
misstatements or omissions. This distinction may be one of the bases for the culpability differences
between section 11 (strict liability for issuers) and Rule lOb-5 (scienter).
141See infra Part IV.C.
14215 U.S.C. § 78u-5.
143"[W]hen an offering document's forecasts, opinions or projections are accompanied by
meaningful cautionary statements, the forward-looking statements will not form the basis for a
securities fraud claim.... In other words, cautionary language, if sufficient, renders the alleged
omissions or misrepresentations immaterial as a matter of law." In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90
F.3d 696, 707 (3d Cir. 1996).
'"15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1).
14515 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B)(i).
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knowledge goes beyond the judicial scienter requirement by not modifying
the intent element through the concept of recklessness.
The protections afforded by statute, however, can be elusive. The
condition that forward-looking statements be accompanied by "meaningful
cautionary statements" is subject to "eye of the beholder" evaluation.
Particularly, when judged with the benefit of hindsight, were the predictions
that we now know were inaccurate sufficiently couched in cautionary
language to merit the statutory protection? Disclosures by bio-pharmas are
necessarily fragmentary, revealing only a small portion of the totality of test
results, interpretive studies, sub-grouping data and other scientific and
documentary materials. In making its public statements regarding the
potential value or efficacy of a product, has the bio-pharma sufficiently
revealed the "important factors" that could affect the attainment of the stated
projections? Boilerplate statements of non-assurance do not suffice;
particularity is the key. Room exists for substantial argument, especially in
hindsight, that sufficient particularity was lacking. One commentator has
suggested that the requirement for particularity with regard to potential FDA
approval might require disclosure that FDA approval is not only contingent
on test results, but that in addition, 1) results are based on certain protocols
and are subject to human errors, 2) that there may be several ways to
interpret test results, 3) that the FDA might not agree that the test protocols
were sufficiently enforced, and 4) that the FDA might interpret the test
results differently. 146
The same factors that may lead to the denial of the first defense, i.e.
meaningful cautionary statements, will also affect the second defense, lack of
actual knowledge of falsity. When a statement is made by a business entity,
plaintiff must prove that the statement was made with the approval of an
executive officer who had actual knowledge that the statement was false or
misleading.147 Given the voluminous nature of the information shared within
the company's executive offices, proof of knowledge of non-disclosed
information that could affect the likelihood of the projected outcome may be
readily attainable.148 The importance of hindsight cannot be underestimated,
as the chances are high that somewhere in the massive materials underlying
the projections there are interpretations and results that can now be seen to
146Fisher, supra note 91, at 123.
14715 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1).
148See, In re Equimed, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 98-CV-5374 NS, 2000 WL 562909, at *5-6
(E.D. Pa. 2000) (explaining a letter sent to every director was used to support scienter allegations);
see also In re Aetna, Inc. Sec. Litig., 34 F. Supp. 2d 935, 953 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (noting because
individual defendants were in high management positions, there was "strong circumstantial
evidence" that defendants had knowledge of the undisclosed facts).
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have a significance not earlier considered or recognized.
Perhaps the greatest problem with reliance on the statutory
protection is that projections are nearly always accompanied by hard, factual
information on which the projections are based. It is extremely difficult for a
publicly-traded bio-pharma to limit its disclosures within the statutory safe
harbor of the 1934 Act.'49 Hard information is not within the statutory
protection and is subject to the standard objections of being misleading or
incomplete. Even if a company attempts to limit its disclosure to a pure
projection, inevitably the questions from market analysts and others will
cause the company to disclose the hard information on which the projections
were based. At this point we are back to standard Rule 1Ob-5 jurisprudence,
replete with its ambiguities regarding scienter, materiality, and omissions.
For example, the statement that the company expected to file an application
with the FDA within a particular time period, itself a projection, was held
not to be entitled to either the "bespeaks caution" doctrine or the statutory
safe harbor where plaintiffs' case was based on the company's alleged failure
to disclose that there were serious flaws in the Phase III testing process.'
Further complicating the projections issue is whether there is a duty
to update if the company determines that prior projections are now materially
inaccurate. Although the trend in Rule 1 Ob-5 cases appears to disfavor an
obligation to update soft information that is clearly set forth as a projection,
the issue has not been fully resolved."' Factors that may affect a court's
decision in a particular case may include 1) the timing of the projection
relative to the discovery of its inaccuracy, 2) the type of cautionary
statements that may have accompanied the projection, 3) the extent of the
14 9See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c).
1oln re Cell Pathways Sec. Litig., No. 99-725, 2000 WL 805221, at *ll (E.D. Pa. 2000).
Defendants argue that each of the challenged statements regarding CPI's plans and
expectations for the NDA filing for exisulind is forward-looking because the statements
relate to CPI's future plans and use language of futurity. However, allegations based upon
omissions of existing facts or circumstances do not constitute forward looking statements
protected by the safe harbor of the Securities Act.
Id (internal quotations omitted).
"'See Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 51 F.3d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir. 1995),
(amended April 7, 1995) ("Some have argued that a duty to update arises when a company makes a
forward-looking statement - a projection - that because of subsequent events becomes untrue....
This court has never embraced such a theory, and we decline to do so now.") Contra, In re Time
Warner Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir. 1993) ("We agree that a duty to update opinions and
projections may arise if the original opinions or projections have become misleading as a result of
intervening events."). The safe harbor created in the 1934 Securities Act post-dates much of the
litigation in this area. The safe harbor's lack of reference to updating projections suggests that
projections initially protected under the safe harbor provisions would not lose their protection by
virtue of subsequent events. This issue however has not been judicially resolved.
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discrepancy between the projection and the current information, and 4) a
court's perceived relationship of the statements to attempted stock market
manipulation."' This is all in addition to claims that the factors that caused
the projection to become inaccurate were known or should have been known
at the time the projection was made.'
E. Compounding the Problem: Lack ofJudicial Expertise
The problems of materiality and scienter applied to bio-pharma class
actions are exacerbated by a lack of expertise on the bench. There is
probably no other publicly-traded industry in which data is so voluminous,
so subject to numerous classifications and sub-categories, and so open to
contrary opinions by industry and regulatory experts. It is difficult to
identify any other product or service offered by publicly-held companies that
generates such problems of data evaluation. Now insert a judge who is
confronted with legal issues of materiality and scienter, opposing experts
dueling over the minutia of clinical trials, disclosures, and scientific
evaluations made over extended periods of time, and one must wonder
whether any judge can feel comfortable finding or denying Rule lOb-5
liability. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer has commented on this
inherent problem:
. . . most judges lack the scientific training that might
facilitate the evaluation of scientific claims or the evaluation
of expert witnesses who make such claims.. . .Furthermore,
science itself may be highly uncertain and controversial with
respect to many of the matters that come before the courts.
Scientists often express considerable uncertainties about the
dangers of a particular substance. . . .What, for example, is
the relevance to human cancer of studies showing that a
substance causes some cancers, perhaps only a few, in test
groups of mice or rats? What is the significance of
extrapolations from toxicity studies involving high doses to
situations where the doses are much smaller? Can lawyers or
152See Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 959 (9th Cir. 1996). The defendant company
responded immediately to contradict a securities analyst's negative prediction as to the likelihood of
FDA approval for a pending drug application, the court noting that "in response to market fears
about FDA approval, Xoma's president flatly stated that'everything [was] going fine.' Such general
statements of optimism, when taken in context, may form a basis for a securities fraud claim.. ." Id.
(internal citations omitted).
53See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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judges or anyone else expect scientists always to be certain or
always to have uniform views with respect to the
extrapolation from a large dose to a small one, when the
causes of and mechanisms related to cancer are generally not
well known. Many difficult legal cases fall within this area of
scientific uncertainty.154
To be sure, there will be occasions when the evidence allows judges
to readily understand the liability issue. Internal memoranda or discussions
may reveal serious concerns, as when the executives of a major
pharmaceutical concluded that adverse event reports were sufficient to be
"putting the brand at risk.'". An equally clear case exists when public
announcements are directly contrary to FDA-expressed concerns. The more
likely scenario, however, is a court faced with a series of press releases
containing both optimistic statements and cautionary disclaimers, underlying
mountains of internal and external reports that fail to be entirely conclusive,
and regulatory denials that may have been as surprising to the company as to
the investing public. Now enter well-financed class action attorneys, with
experts who have spent hundreds of hours sifting through past data, and
defendants' experts who refute each of plaintiffs' allegations with equally
scientifically-oriented arguments, and we are likely to find a judge longing
for the simple case of a good old fashioned fraud. This is not to say that
reported decisions are not well thought through and carefully written.
Rather, it is to suggest that even the most well-meaning jurists may
misunderstand or have uncertainty over the significance of the disputed
scientific data. Hence, it is not surprising to see ajudicial admission that the
decision is a close call,"' or that the ultimate analysis of the merits will be
154STEPHEN BREYER, Introduction to FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL
ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 2,4 (2d ed. 2000), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sciman00.p
df/$file/sciman00.pdf. Justice Breyer clearly had in mind the evidentiary problems arising in bio-
pharma litigation. Elsewhere in his Introduction he observed that:
... a decision wrongly granting compensation, although of immediate benefit to
the plaintiff, can improperly force abandonment of the substance. Thus, if the
decision is wrong, it will improperly deprive the public of what can be far more
important benefits - those surrounding a drug that cures many while subjecting a
few to less serious risk, for example. The upshot is that we must search for law that
reflects an understanding of the relevant underlying science....
Id at 3-4.
155In re Bayer AG Securities Litig.,2004 WL 2190357, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2004)
("The August 2000 safety meeting was a turning point. Various Bayer executives ... agreed that the
confluence of information about the adverse effects of Baycol was 'putting the brand at risk. ...
That knowledge renders defendants' post-August 2000 silence actionable.").
See supra note 137.
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left for another day to the eventual trier of fact.
IV. MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF Sui GENERIS LITIGATION CONCERNS
The most significant bio-pharma litigation problem is the objective
assessment of multiple public disclosures in the context of voluminous data
collected during the development, testing, trial, and marketing periods. Such
data is inevitably subject to varying interpretations, conjectures as to
protocols, explanations as to unanticipated results, and uncertainties as to the
numbers, types, and causes of adverse reactions. Unlike nearly every other
product for which it is the company alone who makes judgments on pre-
marketing and marketing data, judgments by bio-pharmas are subjected to
critique and possible rejection by a federal agency, rejections that themselves
are subject to scientific critique.
The sui generis nature of bio-pharmas poses a difficult issue in the
context of securities litigation. Rule 1 Ob-5 actions against bio-pharmas are
more likely to be based on competing interpretations of scientific data than
the manipulation of financial data. Although a majority of such suits are
dismissed, principally on the failure to meet strict scienter pleading
requirements, there are sufficient difficulties in assessing the voluminous
data that courts may justifiably be hesitant to rule at the motion to dismiss
stage. Moreover, even when bio-pharmas succeed at the motion stage, they
will have incurred substantial litigation costs and financial uncertainties that
could affect ongoing and future research programs. It is not enough, in our
judgment, to say "such is the result of being a publicly-held company." The
extraordinary contingencies affecting bio-pharmas and their investors
require, we believe, something other than an ordinary response.
We have considered and rejected some alternative responses. One
alternative would be to create a Rule 1 Ob-5 carve-out for bio-pharmas, such
as a presumption favoring dismissal of any action against bio-pharmas unless
actual intent to deceive is clearly shown. We do not favor such a carve-out
as it could lead to less carefully prepared and more insufficiently considered
public statements. A second alternative is to consider a limitation on
damages. Investors in bio-pharmas are apt to be well aware of the risks and
volatilities inherent in bio-pharma securities investments. They are hoping
for an investment home run. When matters do not turn out as hoped,
perhaps absent actual malice or intentional deceit by the bio-pharma, these
investors should not be able to recover their entire out-of-pocket damages,
but rather some more limited amount that accounts for their acceptance of
risk. While we find some merit in this approach, it would create substantial
measurement difficulties and may have the effect of reducing securities laws
compliance incentives. Moreover, current jurisprudence does not support a
judicial splitting of the baby, thus securities law decisions necessarily result
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in an all or nothing approach.
If, as we assert, the principal difficulty lies with data assessment, we
believe that the most appropriate reform measure is to assure that the court
has an objective evaluation process at the motion stage through the
consultation of a neutral court-appointed expert.' A court-appointed expert
will not usurp the authority of the judge in weighing the evidence and
determining an outcome. Judge Richard Posner noted that in a case with a
"staggeringly large record . . that includes so much highly technical
statistical material ... [t]he judge ... may not understand the neutral expert
perfectly but at least [the judge] will know that [the expert] has no ax to
grind.""' As discussed below, procedures are already in place to allow
courts to utilize objective evaluations at an early stage in the litigation. Our
recommendation does not call for a radical reform, but rather a greater
emphasis and willingness at the judicial level to use powers that currently
exist.
Court-appointed experts should, in our judgment, be particularly
useful in cases involving substantial data evaluation, which is often the case
where products have failed to gain FDA approval or have been recalled
based on adverse results. More frequent use of court-appointed experts at
the motion stage will give courts much-needed assistance in understanding
complex material, including the troublesome relationship between the
assessment of scientific data using statistical significance and the application
of securities laws using the somewhat ambiguous materiality standard."'
Moreover, the up-front division of costs imposed on the parties may provide
a sobering influence on plaintiffs eager to initiate Rule lOb-5 actions.'"
O5 7 ne judge has expressed the importance of neutral experts in the following terms:
The work of such experts is especially critical in dealing with complex mass tort
problems such as the instant case. The dilemma presented here is a typical of these
exceptional cases: the epidemiological and other scientific questions are complex
and riven with uncertainties and interdependent variables; the number of persons
affected runs into the hundreds of thousands; the courts cannot proceed toward a
just and equitable result without some reasonably firm data projecting the numbers
and volume of claims at issue; and all parties have strong and conflicting interests
in the character of that data. These factors, alone and in combination, point to the
necessity of neutral, expert assistance under the auspices of the court.
In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 830 F. Supp. 686, 693 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1993).
18DEBORAH RUNKLE, Court-Appointed Scientific Experts: Providing Objective Scientific
Advice to the Judiciary, in SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE REVIEW CURRENT ISSUES AT THE CROSSROADS
OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 19,33 (Cynthia H. Cwik & Helen E. Witt, eds., 2007).
'
59See supra Part III.B.
'6Litigation in the "nuisance" category that lacks substantial merit but is brought for quick
settlement purposes may well be discouraged by the prospect of objective expert reports and up-front
costs to cover such reports.
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A. Reform Through the Use of Court-Appointed Experts
In the seminal case Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the
Supreme Court reemphasized the obligation of trial judges to act as
gatekeepers admitting only relevant and reliable evidence."' Preliminarily,
a judge must determine whether the expert is proposing to testify to scientific
knowledge that will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact
in issue."' If the evidence would in some way be helpful to the trier of fact,
then Daubert requires that a judge examine proffered evidence to determine
"whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is
scientifically valid."' This means the judge must determine whether the
evidence or testimony is grounded in the methods and procedures of
science." "Another pertinent [but not dispositive] consideration is whether
the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication."165
Judges may also look to the "known or potential rate of error" and the
"general acceptance" of the evidence in the scientific community.' The
Court emphasized that although this inquiry is a flexible one, the
overarching inquiry must focus on scientific validity of the principles
underlying the proffered evidence.'
The Supreme Court recognized in Daubert that scientific
conclusions are subject to perpetual revision but balanced this uncertainty
with the realistic notion that law must resolve disputes quickly and finally.68
The Court acknowledged that
in practice, a gatekeeping role for the judge, no matter how
flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from
learning of authentic insights and innovations. That,
'
6
'Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
162Id.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods,
and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of
the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
16'509 U.S. at 592-93.
'"Id.at 590.
"'Idat 593-94.
'"Id at 594.
'
67Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95.
'Id at 596.
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nevertheless, is the balance that is struck by Rules of
Evidence designed not for the exhaustive search for cosmic
understanding but for the particularized resolution of legal
disputes.'6 1
This acknowledgement of practical evidentiary limitations cannot be
comforting to bio-pharmas because whether, and what, evidence is
admissible can change the viability of a cause of action or render defense
nearly impossible. The conflicting perspectives and analyses of scientific
data which forms the foundation of materiality or scienter claims may be
included or excluded on the basis of the limited scientific knowledge of the
judiciary. Furthermore, in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, the Supreme
Court determined that the appropriate standard of review of a trial court's
Daubert decision to admit or exclude scientific expert testimony is abuse of
discretion.' Given the low likelihood of success in proving an abuse of
discretion, the importance of getting the decision right the first time is even
more apparent.
The perils a judge faces to admit or exclude scientific evidence in a
way that resolves disputes expediently will often require experience and
knowledge the judge simply does not have."' However, the Court has
offered guidance in Daubert by reminding the judiciary of its ability under
the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE), specifically FRE 706, to procure the
assistance of an expert of its own choosing. 72Additionally, in a concurring
'
6 1d. at 597.
"oGen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997).
11Judges responding to a Federal Judicial Center study stated, "I was aware of the limits of
my knowledge of [biochemistry]" and "I didn't know anything about computer software...."
RUNKLE, supra note 158, at 21.
"'FED. R. EVID. 706 states:
(a) APPOINTMENT. The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any
party enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed,
and may request the parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint any
expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint expert witnesses of
its own selection. An expert witness shall not be appointed by the court unless the
witness consents to act. A witness so appointed shall be informed of the witness'
duties by the court in writing, a copy of which shall be filed with the clerk, or at a
conference in which the parties shall have opportunity to participate. A witness so
appointed shall advise the parties of the witness' findings, if any; the witness'
deposition may be taken by any party; and the witness may be called to testify by
the court or any party. The witness shall be subject to cross-examination by each
party, including a party calling the witness.
(b) COMPENSATION. Expert witnesses so appointed are entitled to reasonable
compensation in whatever sum the court may allow. The compensation thus fixed
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opinion to Joiner, Justice Breyer urged judges to use all possible techniques
that would assist them in making determinations about complex or technical
evidence, including the use of court-appointed experts.' Employing the
administrative and inherent authority of the court to provide itself with
objective analysis, judges in bio-pharma cases involving complex and
voluminous scientific data can more accurately understand the nature of
scientific evidence through the use of court-appointed experts.
1. Appointment of Experts Under the FRE 706
Under FRE 706, the court may on its own motion enter an order to
show cause why an expert witness should not be appointed.'74 The rule
guides and informs the process of appointment, compensation of the witness,
and disclosure to the trier of fact.'" Additionally, the rule provides that
witnesses will testify to the ultimate fact finder and be subject to deposition
and cross-examination by any party."'
One of the first and most influential uses of FRE 706 to appoint
experts was in breast implant litigation. Breast implants are considered
Class III medical devices and require FDA approval before marketing.'" In
1996, Chief Judge Sam Pointer, Jr. of the Northern District of Alabama, who
was charged with handling consolidated federal multidistrict litigation in the
silicone breast implant cases, appointed four experts under Rule 706 to serve
is payable from funds which may be provided by law in criminal cases and civil
actions and proceedings involving just compensation under the fifth amendment. In
other civil actions and proceedings the compensation shall be paid by the parties in
such proportion and at such time as the court directs, and thereafter charged in like
manner as other costs.
(c) DISCLOSURE OF APPOINTMENT. In the exercise of its discretion, the court
may authorize disclosure to the jury of the fact that the court appointed the expert
witness.
(d) PARTIES' EXPERTS OF OWN SELECTION. Nothing in this rule limits the parties
in calling expert witnesses of their own selection.
'522 U.S. at 147-50.
174The order would likely be entered at the pretrial conference held pursuant to FED. R. CIV.
P. 16. Section 16(c)(12) calls for consideration of the need for "adopting special procedures for
managing potentially difficult . .. actions that may involve complex issues . .. or unusual proof
problems." FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(L). At the pretrial conference according to FED. R. EVID.
104(a) "preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence
of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court . .
"'FED. R. EVID.706.
"'FED. R. EVID.706.
'"FDA, Learn if a Medical Device Has Been Cleared by FDA for Marketing (2009),
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ResourcesforYou/Consumers/ucml42523.htm (listing breast
implants as Class Ill devices); see also supra Part II.
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as a National Science Panel in determining the relationship between silicone
gel breast implants and connective-tissue diseases and autoimmune
dysfunction.' Judge Pointer instructed the panel "to review, critique, and
evaluate existing scientific literature, research, and publications" to
determine whether silicone breast implants could have caused a number of
diseases or symptoms.'" The panel heard from plaintiffs and defendant's
experts and reviewed voluminous materials consisting of more than 2000
documents submitted by counsel.'s After completing its report, the panel
was subject to discovery through deposition by counsel. The report largely
concluded that scientific evidence could not demonstrate a causal link
between the implants and any systemic disease."' Other similar panels have
been used in asbestos litigation,' Dalkon Shield contraceptive device
litigation,"' and environmental toxic tort litigation.'"
2. Appointment of Experts Under Inherent Judicial Authority
Supplementing Rule 706 is the inherent authority of the court to
carry out its duties by employing necessary resources including "technical
advisors."' Technical advisors, unlike experts appointed under Rule 706,
I781n re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prod.Liab.Litig., No. CV 92-P-10000-S, 1996 WL
34401813, at *1 (N.D. Ala. May 31, 1996); see also Barbara S. Hulka et al., Experience of a
Scientific Panel Formed to Advise the Federal Judiciary on Silicone Breast Implants, 342 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 812, 812 (2000) (providing insight by members of the Pointer panel).
I791n re Silicone Gel Breast Implants, 1996 WL 34401813, at *3.
80See Hulka, supra note 178, at 813.
18 'See Peter Tugwell, Report of National Science Panel, Chapter IV 41 (1998),
http://www.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/SCIENCE/chap4.pdf. (After the panel's report was complete several
defendants, including Dow Corning, settled the case. Cases that remained were remanded back to
their respective districts with the ability to use the panel's report and testimony at trial.).
182See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 830 F. Supp 686, 693 (E. &S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(using scientific experts under Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 706 to estimate future asbestos
claims).
18 3Glasser v. A.H. Robbins Co., 950 F.2d 147, 147 (4th Cir. 1991) (appointing an expert "to
advise the court on estimation of Dalkon Shield Claims").
'8See Renaud v. Martin Marietta Corp., 749 F. Supp. 1545, 1548 (D. Colo. 1990), affd,
972 F.2d 304 (10th Cir. 1992) (granting summary judgment for defendant on testimony of three
court-appointed experts including a physician, geologist, and toxicologist).
'
8 See generally In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920) ("Courts have (at least in the
absence of legislation to the contrary) inherent power to provide themselves with appropriate
instruments required for the performance of their duties."); Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149,
154 n.4 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting "[s]uch power inheres generally in a district court"); Scott v. Spanjer
Bros., 298 F.2d 928, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1962) ("[w]e believe that the appointment of an impartial
medical expert by the court in the exercise of its sound discretion is an equitable and forward-
looking technique for promoting the fair trial of a lawsuit."); see also FED. R. EVID. 706 advisory
committee's note ("[t]he inherent power of a trial judge to appoint an expert of his own choosing is
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do not testify nor give evidence, but rather consult with the judge on matters
requiring specific expertise.'"' In Reilly v. United States, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals suggested general factors that might justify appointment of
a technical advisor, including "problems ofunusual difficulty, sophistication,
and complexity, involving something well beyond the regular questions of
fact and law with which judges must routinely grapple."8"
In Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., Judge Robert E. Jones of the
District of Oregon appointed a panel of scientific experts to assist him in
ruling on motions to exclude plaintiffs expert testimony on a link between
silicone implants and autoimmune disorders and connective tissue disease.'
Judge Jones noted that "[i]n view of the complicated scientific and medical
issues involved and in an effort to effectively discharge my role as
'gatekeeper' under Daubert I, I invoke my inherent authority as a federal
district court judge to appoint independent advisors to the court."'" The
technical advisors, including an epidemiologist, rheumatologist,
immunologist-toxicologist, and polymer chemist,' provided reports that
assisted Judge Jones in excluding evidence that did not meet acceptable
standards of scientific validity."'
3. Appointment of Special Masters Under FRCP 53
Judges may also appoint special masters under Rule 53 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) in order to facilitate discovery,
resolve disputes, and manage other parts of the pretrial phase of complex
scientific litigation.'" Special masters may not decide motions or make other
dispositive rulings; they perform nonadjudicative functions such as
"preliminary assessments of technical or scientific evidence offered by the
parties [or] to identify and [manage] court-appointed experts."'" For
example, Judge Jones in Baxter Healthcare used a special master to identify
candidates to serve on a panel of court-appointed experts.19
Appointment of a special master is reserved for special
virtually unquestioned.").
'
86WILLIAM W SCHWARZER& JOE S. CECIL, Management of Expert Evidence, in
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EvIDENCE 39,59 (2d ed. 2000),
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sciman00.pdf/$file/scimanO.pdf
"'Reilly, 863 F.2d at 157.
"947 F. Supp. 1387, 1393-94 (D. Or. 1996).
1891d. at 1392.
'9'See id. at 1393.
'
91See id. at 1394.
192See SCHWARZER& CECIL, supra note 186, at 63; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 53.
19
3See SCHWARZER& CECIL, supra note 186, at 63-65.
94947 F. Supp. 1387, 1392-93 (D. Or. 1996).
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circumstances. The Advisory Committee Notes to FRCP 53 indicate that
district judges "bear the primary responsibility for the work of their courts"
and "appointment of a master must be the exception and not the rule."'"
Significantly, however, Justice Breyer has recommended the appointment of
special masters in matters involving complex scientific or technical
evidence.'"9 Bio-pharma litigation, with its complex scientific or technical
evidence, thus presents the perfect opportunity to engage special masters to
assist the judiciary.
B. Judicial Concerns in the Appointment ofExperts
Despite the urging of members of the Supreme Court and the clear
authority to appoint experts, judges have been reluctant to utilize this
methodology.'"9  One judge explained his hesitancy by noting that
appointment of experts will be outcome-determinative, fearing that the
apparent objectivity of the expert would give an inappropriate advantage to
one party or the other.'" Another view is that appointment of experts
conflicts with their sense of the judicial role in the adversary system.'9 9
Judges have also expressed concern about the difficulty of sourcing and
compensating experts.20 0 Additionally, concerns of neutrality exist as it may
be very difficult to find experts who have had no prior history with particular
bio-pharma companies or their products, particularly because many doctors
and academic departments have funding and research relationships with
major bio-pharma companies.20'
'
95FED.R. Civ. P. 52, Advisory Committee Notes (2003).
96See General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 147-50 (1997) (Breyer J., concurring).
'7Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert's Invitation: Defining a Rolefor
Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995, 997 (1994).
'"See, e.g., Hiem v. Sarpy, 161 F.R.D. 332, 336 (E.D. La. 1995).
'
99Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87 GEO. L.J. 1983,
2015 (1999).
200In response to a Federal Judicial Center study questionnaire, judges "spoke of the
difficulty in recruiting unbiased experts with the knowledge demanded in litigation. Some didn't
know where to turn to initiate the process." RUNKLE, supra note 158, at 25.
Unless and until there is a national register of experts on various subjects and a
method by which they can be fairly compensated, the federal amateurs wearing
black robes will have to overlook their new gatekeeping function lest they assume
the intolerable burden of becoming experts themselves in every discipline known to
the physical and social sciences, and some as yet unknown but sure to blossom.
BREYER, supra note 154, at 7 (citing Letter from Judge William Acker, Jr. to the Judicial
Conference of the United States et al. (Jan.2, 1998)).
20 1See David J. Damiani, Proposals for Reform in the Evaluation of Expert Testimony in
Pharmaceutical Mass Tort Cases, 13 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 517, 544 (2003) (discussing expert
neutrality as "[p]rofessional societies and university departments may encourage testimony that
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Many of these concerns, however, can be alleviated. Neutrality and
sourcing costs have been addressed by the formation of bodies which make
the sourcing of experts easier and more reliable. The trial judge may appoint
a private search firm or a special master to seek experts and to vet
qualification and conflict concerns. For example, the American Association
for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Court Appointed Scientific
Experts (CASE) project2 02 can provide services to assist the judiciary in
sourcing experts.203 Upon receiving a request from ajudge, CASE conducts
searches for experts with requested scientific qualifications." A
representative of CASE directly contacts potential experts to determine their
qualifications to testify on a particular issue and to screen for potential
conflicts.205 CASE will then provide one or more recommendations of
individual experts or panelists to the court.2"' A court-appointed expert or
panel would not, of course, opine on matters of law, such as what constitutes
scienter, or whether a particular misstatement or omission was material.
Those issues remain for the trier of fact. But a court faced with such issues
often must first grapple with and discern volumes of complex data and
conflicting interpretations. It is in this fact ascertainment arena that neutral
experts would be most beneficial.207 Ultimately, it will be the judge's
favors businesses in the industry that fund their respective organizations"); see also Linda A.
Johnson, Pfizer paid doctors, hospitals $35 million in last half of 2009, USA TODAY, March 31,
2010, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/health/2010-03-31-pfizer-doctor-
paymentsN.htm?csp=usat.me#usPageReturn ("Prizer paid doctors and teaching hospitals a total of
$35 million in the last half of 2009 for services ranging from speaking to other doctors about the
company's products to running studies of its experimental drugs.").
202RUNKLE, supra note 158, at 26-38; see generally CASE Website,
http://www.aaas.org/spp/case/case.htm.
203RUNKLE, supra note 158, at 25 ("Judge Acker (mentioned at supra note 200)
subsequently turned to CASE to identify and recommend an expert to assist him in a pretrial
hearing.").
204See id. at 29.
2osId. at 30.
2061d. at 30-31.
207 We recognize that a court is required at the motion to dismiss stage to accept well-pleaded
allegations as true. Nevertheless, plaintiffs' complaints and defendants' motions are replete with
exhibits setting forth evaluations, reports, evidence of various studies, and other data that must be
understood in order to rule on the motion. Even if the principal basis of a motion to dismiss is the
lack of scienter, to reach a conclusion that scienter did not exist requires analysis of substantial
reports and data. Legal conclusions are necessarily based on analysis of facts, and in many bio-
pharma cases there is no escape from the need to gain an organized, comprehensive understanding
of the fundamental facts in light of the alleged offensive disclosures. As noted in In re Medicis
Pharm. Corp. Sec. Litig., 689 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1202 (D. Ariz. 2009), in considering a motion to
dismiss regarding scienter "federal courts are required to consider whether 'all of the facts alleged,
taken collectively, give rise to a strong inference of scienter, not whether any individual allegation,
scrutinized in isolation, meets that standard.'(citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makoor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,
551 U.S. 308, 323#(2007) (emphasis removed)). . . . [Clourts must 'consider the totality of the
circumstances."' (citingZucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F. 3d 982, 992 (9th Cir. 2009)
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determination whether an expert meets scientific qualifications to testify or
whether a prior relationship disqualifies a potential expert.208  Another
efficient means of sourcing experts is through the appointment of a special
master under FRCP 53 to assist in identifying experts.2"'
Although the concern by judges that the ultimate trier of fact in the
case of a jury trial may place undue weight upon the testimony of court-
appointed experts is valid, the ultimate determination whether to disclose to
a jury that an expert was appointed by the court is left to the judge's
discretion.210 If ajudge determines that ajury should know the nature of the
witness's induction into the case, Section 6(e) of the ABA Litigation Section
Civil Trial Practice Standards provides guidance on potential jury
instructions to minimize the expert's appearance of undue authority because
of his association with the court.211
Additionally, the appointment of experts could have a beneficial
externality in the form of settlement negotiations. Neither party may want to
wait for the report of court-appointed experts, especially in large class action
litigation. The parties in the breast implant litigation overseen by Judge
Pointer may have been driven to the negotiating table by the risk of the
National Science Panel's findings on causality of silicone gel breast
implants.212 The fact that a judge is seeking an expert may encourage
settlement."' A CASE search for a court-appointed expert was suspended
when parties learned the judge contacted CASE for referral of an expert and
settled.214 Other suggested benefits of court-appointed experts include
(citation omitted)).
208See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93, 595-97 (1993)
(recognizing trial judge as gatekeeper for reliability of scientific expert testimony); see also Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997) (holding that trial judge's exclusion of proffered
expert testimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion).
209Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1392-93 (D. Or. 1996) (noting the
Judge used a special master to identify candidates to serve on a panel of court-appointed experts).
2 1 0Monolithic Power Sys. v. 02 Micro Int'l Ltd., 558 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(finding no abuse of discretion in district court's disclosure of doctor's independent status to the
jury); see also FED. R. EvID. 706(c) ("[I]n the exercise of its discretion, the court may authorize
disclosure to the jury of the fact that the court appointed the expert witness.").
21lA.B.A., CIVIL TRIAL PRACTICE STANDARDS 9-10, available at http://www.abane
t.org/litigation/civiltrialstandards/ctps.pdf.
212David J. Morrow, Implant Maker Reaches Accord on Damage Suits, N.Y. TIMES, July 9,
1998, at Al (reporting that defendant Dow Coming Corporation reached a settlement with plaintiffs
lawyers in advance of the final report); see also supra note 178 and accompanying text.
213We are not advocating that cases should necessarily be settled based on objective expert
reports. Settlements are often driven by the uncertainty surrounding the outcome of a particular
motion. If one or the other side is particularly confident in its position and the anticipated result of
an objective expert evaluation, settlement may be appropriate and will generally favor the stronger
side. Settlement may not always be appropriate, however, especially where contested facts merits
more extensive examination of witnesses and data than is possible at a motion stage.
214RUNKLE, supra note 158, at 24.
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increasing the overall quality of testimony from the adversarial experts."'
Court-appointed experts are likely to be costly, even more so if the
court determines that a panel would be appropriate. Expert fees and
expenses could easily range into six figures. Although this may seem a
considerable amount for assisting the court in carrying out its duties, the cost
of a court-appointed expert seems small in comparison to the magnitude of
bio-pharma litigations claims. The use of a court-appointed expert and the
associated cost imposed on both parties could also benefit settlement
negotiations. Litigation may be diminished, or settlement negotiations may
begin sooner, if plaintiffs are likely to incur substantial upfront costs to fund
a scientific expert or panel of experts at the motion to dismiss stage.
C. Recommended Uses of Scientific Experts
Although the appointment of scientific experts may not be necessary
in most types of civil litigation, there is no doubt that the volume and nature
of scientific data in bio-pharma litigation requires courts to consider the
assistance of scientific experts. Reports, interpretations, and sheer raw data
generated by clinical trials and adverse event reports over a period of years
can be best understood by scientific practitioners with an eye for statistical
interpretation. Judges should utilize this expertise to make more informed
decisions about the inclusion or exclusion of evidence. In addition, when
the judge is called upon to resolve motions or to be the ultimate trier of fact,
a more thorough understanding of the scientific basis of claims may
substantially inform decisions of materiality or scienter.
It is likely that one or more of the parties will try to show cause in
opposition to the appointment of an objective expert. Either or both of the
parties may be fearful of the expert's conclusions, may not want to bear the
cost, or may be so confident in their own experts that they would fear the
intrusion of another. Yet, examples such as breast implant, asbestos, and
Dalkon shield litigation support the use of court-appointed experts.216
Whatever the reasons for objections, we believe that the objecting parties
should bear a heavy burden in dissuading the trial judge from utilizing FRE
706 or the court's inherent appointment authority.
When considering the use of court-appointed scientific experts, the
judiciary should approach the litigation as divided into two categories: (1)
Limited Scientific Evidence or Clear Fraud, where no scientific experts
2
"Id. (suggesting that knowing their testimony will be scrutinized by a court-appointed
expert, partisan experts may adopt more balanced views or modify their testimony).
2 16See supra Part IV.A.
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would be necessary; and (2) Substantial Accumulation of Scientific
Evidence, where scientific experts should be considered.
1. Limited Scientific Evidence or Clear Fraud
Not every bio-pharma case will require the use of court-appointed
experts. No expert will be required where a bio-pharma has clearly
committed fraud like falsifying data or knowingly making a false statement
about a drug's success. The outcome of these types of cases will not hinge
upon differing scientific minds and little scientific data will be necessary.
Rather, the outcome will depend on proving the actions or mental state of the
parties involved in perpetrating the fraud. For example, in Twinde v.
Threshold Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a 1 Ob-5 claim survived the motion to
dismiss where, after disclosing evidence of liver toxicity associated with its
drug to the FDA, the company failed to make mention of the problems in a
press release and quarterly report.217 The motion turned not upon elaborate
interpretation of scientific data but upon establishing actions by defendants
in failing to disclose facts that would necessarily prevent or delay FDA
approval."'
Another case reflecting more traditional notions of securities fraud is
In re Nuvelo, Inc. Securities Litigation, where the plaintiffs survived a
motion to dismiss by alleging that fraudulent statements and omissions
concerning the use of a more stringent 0.00125 p-value in a clinical trial
adversely affected the stock price.219 Plaintiffs may not be able to meet a
higher evidentiary standard to show the undisclosed p-value had an effect on
the stock price, but the determination will likely not turn on differing
scientific minds or intense statistical analysis. Rather, proof of the
statements concerning the clinical trial and any actions by Nuvelo that
misled investors or concealed known risks of investing will be key in
determining the claim. The judiciary is well versed in run-of-the-mill fraud
cases and the appointment of experts would be an unnecessary expense
thrust upon the parties.
2. Substantial Accumulation of Scientific Evidence
When substantial scientific data is involved, such as multi-phase
217Twinde v. Threshold Pharm., Inc., No. C 07-4972 CW, 2009 WL 928132, *11 (N.D.
Cal. 2009).
2181d at *12.
219668 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1230 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
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clinical trial data, pre-clinical animal studies, adverse reaction data, and drug
composition or device information, the court should strongly consider
appointing scientific experts. Interpretation of the data, viewed in light of a
bio-pharma's internal decisions and public disclosures, is likely to be
outcome determinative.
Court appointment of experts under FRE 706 should be the
preferred course because these experts will not only provide scientific
testimony but may also be deposed by each party.220 Judges have expressed
concern for the use of FRE 706 scientific expert appointment because the
testimony may be unduly influential to a jury.22 This concerisirrelevantat
the motion to dismiss stage because the judge will not be influenced
unnecessarily by the testimony of the court-appointed expert. Additionally,
each adversarial party maintains the ability to present expert testimony and
the judge will weigh it just as he or she weighs the court-appointed expert's
testimony.222
If the case moves past the motion to dismiss stage, a greater concern
is warranted for the appearance of undue authority a court-appointed expert
portrays. Although the judge may decline to inform the jury that the expert
is court appointed, it is unlikely that this information will remain unknown
after questioning by both the plaintiff and defendant. Two possibilities exist
for resolving this conflict. The first is to forego appointment under FRE 706
and instead use the inherent powers of the court to appoint technical
advisors. These advisors provide no testimony to the ultimate trier of fact,
but rather assist the judge in scientific matters. The second resolution is to
provide an appropriate jury instruction with the knowledge that the jury must
make decisions about the credibility of all witness testimony. In many cases,
the influence of a properly sourced neutral expert may cause no harm, as
both parties will continue to present a number of experts to proffer testimony
that will be considered by the jury. Moreover, it is worth noting that the
supposed influence of a court-appointed expert may well be warranted, given
the expert's neutrality. Courts should welcome the expert's role rather than
avoid it on speculative grounds.
The use of court-appointed experts is especially compelling, we
believe, when the bio-pharma litigation involves a drug or device that has
been recalled or when the FDA has denied approval of the new drug
application. A class action based on product recall or a drug that has been
220FED. R. EvID. 706(a).
221See supra Part IV.B. and accompanying notes.
222FED. R. EVID. 706(d) ("Nothing in this rule limits the parties in calling expert witnesses
of their own selection.").
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denied marketing approval is likely to be accompanied by even more
emphasis on the interpretation of scientific data.22 3 Adverse patient reactions
may be the subject of substantial debate concerning whether such reactions
were caused by the drug or by an opportunistic infection.224 The parties will
argue zealously for or against either proposition with experts, studies,
adverse reaction data, and statistics. In the middle will be a judge, likely
with limited scientific knowledge.
In the case of an FDA denial, plaintiffs and defendants will proffer
voluminous scientific materials relative to the bio-pharma's public
disclosures during the application process. For example, the FDA may have
provided a Complete Response Letter that "[t]he investigations required
under section 505(b) of the [Food, Drug and Cosmetic] act do not include
adequate tests by all methods reasonably applicable to show whether or not
the drug is safe for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or
suggested in its proposed labeling."225 If this reason was provided, both
parties would scrutinize study protocols and the data's scientific reliability to
bolster either plaintiffs alleged misrepresentations or the bio-pharma's
defense of reasonable belief and lack of scienter. Again, this instance would
call for serious and strong consideration of the use of a court-appointed
neutral scientific expert to assist the judge in managing the case at the
motion to dismiss stage.
V. CONCLUSION
Rule 1 Ob-5, a powerful weapon against any publicly listed company
whose share price drops on adverse news, is particularly skewed against bio-
pharmas. It is not a coincidence that there are a disproportionate number of
class actions filed against bio-pharmas.226 The volume and complexity of
data underlying most bio-pharma cases create enormous outcome
uncertainties, settlement pressures, and potentially huge contingent liabilities
over substantial periods of time. Erroneous scientific interpretations could
mean significant and costly future legal battles for a bio-pharma. The
223For example, substantial clinical data and interpretations of"statistical significance" were
central to the decision of the court at the motion to dismiss stage in In re Pizer, Inc. Securities
Litigation, 584 F. Supp. 2d 621, 629-37 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). The court examined clinical trial data in
three studies conducted over a five-year period indicated adverse cardiovascular events associated
with the drugs Celebrex and Bextra. Id. at 629-30. The FDA had previously requested Pfizer to
remove Bextra from the market, and it imposed a "black box" warning on Celebrex. Id. at 631.
224See supra note 103 (discussing opportunistic infection associated with Biogen Idec, Inc.'s
multiple sclerosis drug Tysabri).
22521 C.F.R § 314.125 (2010).226KOTLER, supra note 12, at 2.
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vulnerability and risks faced by bio-pharmas in Rule 1 Ob-5 class actions is
unique among all publicly-traded industries, yet many cases proceed along
traditional grounds without courts employing either their statutory or
inherent powers to obtain objective expert assessment of the data underlying
plaintiffs' claims. Mostjudges have neither the training, nor the capacity, to
differentiate between the positions of opposing experts or to reach their own
independent assessment of the research data. A judicial reluctance appears
to exist regarding the court appointment of experts under FRE 706 or the
court's inherent authority to appoint experts or masters for assistance
purposes. We do not believe that such reluctance is justified, as evidenced
by the occasional successful use of objective experts in highly complex
factual litigation."'
Rule 1Ob-5 allegations can cover a broad range of perceived
misdoing, from run-of-the mill cover ups to misinterpretations of testing or
adverse reaction results. These variations suggest that any procedural rule
applicable to all Rule lOb-5 actions would be inappropriately broad. We
have therefore necessarily limited our reform proposal to the precatory
urging that courts be better trained and advised to utilize the powers they
possess to obtain expert assistance at the early motion stages. The unstated
premise of the Daubert opinion is that courts have an obligation to fully
understand the evidence prior to any decision-making, and that the use of
court-appointed experts will allow courts to decide motions to dismiss with
greater confidence and accuracy.228 Moreover, the early appointment of such
experts may have the salutary effect of causing plaintiffs to pause to consider
whether the claims are sufficient to warrant the up-front imposition of court-
appointed expert costs. Although the identification and qualification of
independent experts may be difficult given the extensive inter-relationships
between bio-pharmas and academic and research institutions, there are
private organizations and judicially-appointed masters that can assist in such
searches. Our proposal may result in a slowing of the judicial process and
potentially higher litigation costs. Yet, if courts begin to recognize in greater
numbers the importance of obtaining objective expert testimony, we believe
a more level playing field will evolve to reduce the disproportionate
vulnerability of bio-pharmas to securities law class actions.
227See supra notes 170-76, 180-86, 202-03 and accompanying text.
228See supra notes 153-64 and accompanying text (discussing Daubert).
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